

APHORISMS
OF
STATE,

GROUND

On Authority and Experience,
and illustrated with the
choycest Examples and Hi-
storical Observations.

By Sr. WALTER RALEIGH Kt.



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
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THE



I

THE
Cabinet-Council:
Containing the chief Arts of
EMPIRE,
AND
Mysteries of State.

CHAP. I.

*The Definition and Division of Publick
Weales and Sovereign States, ac-
cording to their severall species or
kinds.*



Common-wealth is a certain
Sovereign Government of many
Families, with those things that
are common among them.

All Common-wealths are } Monarchies,
either } Aristocracies,
} Democracies.

A Monarchie is that State where the So-
B veraignty

veraignty resteth in the person of one only Prince.

An Aristocratie, is where some small part of the people have in them as a body corporate, the Sovereignty and supream power of the whole State.

A Democratie, is where all the people have Power and Authority Sovereign.

So doth it appear, that the place and person where the Sovereignty resteth, doth cause the State to be either a Monarchie, an Aristocratie, or Popular Government.

CHAP. II.

Of Sovereign or Monarchick Government, with its Essentiall markes, and Specificall differences.

Sovereignty is an absolute and perpetual power in every publike State and he is properly and only a Sovereign, that acknowledgeth no Superior or Equal, nor holdeth of any other Prince, person or power, but God and his own sword.

The First mark of Sovereignty is absolute Power and Authority to command all Subjects in general, and every of them in particular, without consent of any other person

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son or persons, either greater or inferior to himself.

The Second mark of Majesty is Authority to make War, and conclude Peace at his pleasure.

The Third is Power to bestow all Honors and cheif Offices at his pleasure.

The Fourth marke of Soveraigntie is Appellation.

The Fifth mark and last, is power to pardon all Subjects by rigor of Law or otherwise condemned in Life, Lands, Goods, or Honors.

These Powers are not to be imparted to any Officer, Deputy or other Magistrate, but in the Princes absence, and for some urgent occasion.

Monarchies are of three sorts } Signioril,
} Royal,
} Tyrannical.

The Diversitie of Monarchies doth not proceed from the Nature of the State, but the diverse proceedings of those Princes that governe; for great difference there may be between the nature of the Common wealth and the Government thereof. That Prince that giveth the Magistracies, Honors and Offices without respect of Nobility, Riches or Vertue, may be said to governe popularly. And that Monarchy may be said to be

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governed Aristocratically, when the Monarch imparteth the principal Honors and Offices to the Noble and Rich men only.

The same difference there is to be found in States Aristocratical and Popular: for the one and the other may be both Signioril, or Tyrannical.

A Monarch Signioril is he who by force of Arms and just War, is made owner of mens bodies and goods, and governeth them as a Master of a Familie governeth base Servants and Slaves.

A Monarch Royal, is he whose Subjects are obedient unto his Laws, and the Monarch himself obeyeth the Lawes of God and Nature, suffering every Subject to enjoy liberty natural, with property in Lands and Goods, governing as a Father governeth his Children.

A Monarch Tyrannical, is he who without regard to the Law of God or Nature, commandeth Free-men as Slaves, and useth their Lands and Goods as his own.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

*Of Monarchie Signioril, Exemplified
in the Turkish and West-Indian Em-
pire.*

ALL people subject to Princes, are governed as Free-men by their Prince and certain other particular Lords of Lands and Liberties; who not by the Princes Commission but by antient Lawes or Custom have Inheritance and Tenements; or else they are by one Prince and his Ministers commanded, which Ministers have not by Law, or Ordinance, any Authority or Interest of themselves, but being like to the people (base men and slaves) they command only by Commission in the Princes name; and the Authority of those Ministers doth cease at the Princes pleasure, so that the people doe not acknowledg any superior but the Prince, nor owe any service to other mean Lords: So as all the people stand without propertie in Lands or Goods; for example, the Empire of Turkey and the West Indies.

The Provinces of this Monarchie are allotted to sundrie Magistrates or Ministers,

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and they altered and removed at the Princes pleasure; but it is otherwise in a Monarchie Royal, because the Monarch is there accompanied with many mean Lords. And albeit those mean Lords are Subjects unto the Prince, yet have they particular Tenants who may not without just cause be dispossessed by the Prince; and those people having had dependency of their Lords and their Ancestors, do ever beare unto them a certain naturall love and dutifull respect: who so therefore compareth these Principalities, shall perceive, that to Conquer a State Signioril there is great difficultie; but being conquered, it may easily be maintained for the difficultie to conquer such a State, proceedeth from the lack of mean Lords to call in and assist the Prince that doth invade: who therefore desireth to subdue a Nation thus governed, must of force assault all the people, and rather trust in his own strength then the aide of the Country. But if he can prevaile, then one only feare remaineth, which is the Princes posteritie, which necessarily must be extinguished, because the Princes race only hath interest both in the People and Soldiers. But to enter a Monarchy Royal, is an enterprise of no great difficulty, when he that doth enter, hath the friendship and aide of some
mean

mean Lords to take his part, and prepar
the place where he is to arrive.

CHAP. III.

*Of Monarchies Royal, with the means
to maintaine them.*

Monarchies Royal, are for the most
part antient and hereditary, and
consequently easie to be governed. For it is
sufficient for the Prince to maintain the old
Laws, and on occasion temporize with
those accidents that happen: such a State
cannot be taken from the Prince without
excessive force, and if it be, it shall be soon
recovered. Example, *England and France.*

But if a Monarchie newly conquered, be
annexed unto an old, and not properly an-
tient, then is it with much more difficulty
maintained.

First, for that men naturally inclined to
variation are easily induced to take arms
against him that newly governeth.

Secondly, every new Prince is forced to
exact aswell upon those Subjects that joy-
ned with him as those that did resist him,
and therefore shall offend both. Example,
*Ireland annexed to the Crown of England:
Sicilia and Naples to Spaine.* The

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The means to maintain such a Monarchie,
is,

First to extinguish the race of him that
was anciently Prince.

Secondly, to continue all Lawes and
Customes in the former force; for so shall
the Subject find nothing altered but the
Prince, and therefore will soon rest conten-
ted: and the rather if that new Monar-
chie and the antient dominion of the Prince
be of one Language: But if the people be of
a contrary Language and humor, then to
hold it, there needeth great industrie and
fortune: in that case the best way is that
the Prince should inhabit there, as well to
incounter all inconveniences proceeding
from the Subject, as to preserve the people
from oppression of his own Ministers. Ano-
ther way is to send thither certain Colonies,
and plant them in fit places, or else to settle
some garisons both of horse and foot;
but Colonies are less chargeable to the
Prince: As for the people inhabitant (who
must necessarily remove, they being a small
number and dispossessed) they cannot have
power to offend: for in that case, this Rule
or Maxime shall be found true, that men
must be either kindly intreated, or with all
extremity oppressed; because of light in-
juries they may be revenged, but of utter
oppression they cannot.

A Third way to hold a conquered dominion, is, to cherish and defend the neighbors of little power, and oppress or keep under those that are most potent; and above all to take order that no forraign Prince or power doe enter; for it is ever to be looked for, that so many of the nation as are discontented, either for ambition or feare, will be ever readie to bring in strangers, and to conclude this matter of Principalitie annexed, I say it behoveth every Prince possessed of such a State, never to increase the power of any potent neighbor, never to oppress those that are of small power, never to permit any forraign potentate to enter, but ever to plant Colonies and Garrisons, or else to make that dominion his cheif habitation.

CHAP. V.

Of Monarchies Tyrannical.

TYrannical Princes are not advanced by favor, neither doe they trust unto Fortune, but by degrees of Warr, or else by some other indirect meanes do aspire unto greatness; and therein do maintain themselves by all wayes either honest or dishonest,

honest, without respect of Justice, Conscience or Law either of Nations or Nature: A Prince by such impious means aspired, and desiring to hold that he hath gained, will take order that the Cruelties he committeth may be done roundly, suddenly, and as it were at an instant; For if they be executed at leisure and by piece-meale, then will the Princes fears continue long, and the terror in Subjects take deeper impression, whose nature is such that either they must be bound by benefits, or by cruelty made sure from offending; Example, *Dionysius* and *Agathocles*.

CHAP. VI.

Of new found Monarchies and Principalities, with the means to perpetuate them.

SOME other Princes there are that from private Estate have aspired to Sovereignty not by unnatural or impious proceedings as the former, but by vertue and fortune, and being aspired have found no great difficulty to be maintained; for such a Prince having no other dominion, is forced to settle himself where he is become a Prince; But here

is to be noted that albeit such a man be vertuous, yet wanting fortune, his vertue proveth to small purpose, and fortune without vertue doth seldome work any great effect. Howsoever it be, a Prince being aspired, both by the aide of the one and of the other, shall notwithstanding find some difficulty to hold what he hath gotten : because he is forced to introduce new Lawes and new Orders of government differing from the old, aswell for his own security, as confirmation of the Government : for avoiding of which dangers, he is to consider whether he be of himself able to compell his Subjects to obey, or must pray in aide of others ; If he can doe the first, he needeth not doubt ; but being driven to the other, his greatness cannot long continue, for albeit a matter of no difficultie it is to perswade a people, yet to make them constant, is a work well neer impossible. Example, *Theſeus, Cyrus, Romulus.* The Second sort of new Princes are such as be aspired by favor or corruption, or by the vertue or greatness of fortune or friends : A Prince by any or all these means advanced, and desirous to hold his Estate, must indeavor by his own vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other : which may be done by this means ; First, to assure all enemies from offending.

sending. Secondly, to win the love and
 friendship of so many neighbours as possible
 he may. Thirdly to compass all designs tend-
 ing to his honor or profit, and bring
 them to pass either by fraud or force.
 Fourthly, to make himself honoured and fol-
 lowed of Captains and Soldiers. Fifthly,
 to oppress all those that would or can offend
 him. Sixthly, to be obsequious & liberal to friends,
 magnanimous & terrible to Foes. Seventhly,
 to casse all old and unfaithfull bands and
 entertain new. Eighthly, to hold such Amities
 with Kings and Princes, as they ought reason-
 ably to favor him. or else they would
 offend; easily they cannot. Example, *Ga-
 vanni, Torrigiani, Caesar Borgia.*

The Third and last meanes whereby pri-
 vate persons doe aspire to Principalities, is
 not force and violence, but meer good-will
 and favor of men. The cause or occasion
 thereof, is only vertue, or fortune, or at
 least a certain fortunate craft and wittiness,
 because he aspireth either by favor of the
 People, or by favor of the Nobilitie; for
 these contrary humors are in all Common-
 wealths to be found. And the reason thereof
 is, that the great men do ever endeavor
 to oppress the people, and the people do
 labor not to be oppressed by them. Of
 these divers appetites one of these three
 effects

effects doe proceed, viz. Principallie, Liberty, or Licentious life. Principality may come either by love of the multitude, or of the great men: for when any of these factions do find it self oppressed, then do they soon consent to make one a Prince, hoping by his vertue and valor to be defended. Example, *Francesco Sforza, Alessandro de Medici.*

A Prince in this sort aspired, to maintain his Estate, must first consider well by which of these factions aforesaid he is advanced: for if by favor of great men he be aspired, then must he meet with many difficulties, for having about him divers persons of great qualitie, and such as were but lately his equals, hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth; But if the Prince be advanced by the people, few or none shall hardly disobey him. So it appeareth that a Prince made by the multitude is much more secure then he whom the Nobilitie preferreth: for common people doe not desire to enjoy more then their own, and to be defended from opprestion; but great men doe studie not only to hold their own, but also to command and insult upon inferiours.

Note that all Monarchies are Principalities,

But all Principalities are not Monarchies.

CHAP. VII.

Of Councils, and Counsellors in general.

A Senate or Council is a certain lawful assembly of Counsellors to give advice to him or them that have in the comon Weale Power Sovereign.

A Counsellor is called in the Latine *Senator* ; which word signifieth in effect an old man: The *Grecians* and *Romans* also most commonly composed their Councils of ancient and expert persons ; for if they or the greater part of them had bin young men, then might the Council have more properly bin called a Juverate then a Senate.

The chief and most necessary note required in a Counsellor is to have no dependence of any other Prince or Commonweale ; either Oath, Homage, Natural obligation, Pension, or reward : In this point the *Venetians* have bin ever most precise, and for that reason, doe not admit any Cardinal or other Clergieman to be either of or

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at their Councils, therefore when the *Veneri-*
an Senate is assembled, the Usher being ready
to shut the dore cryeth aloud, *Fuora Preti,*
Depart Priest.] Note also that in every state
of what quality soever, a secret or Cabinet-
Council is mainly necessary.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Councils in some particular Mo-
narchies, Aristocracies, and Demo-
cracies.

THe King of *Spain*, for the govern-
ment of his Dominions hath seven
Councils (*viz*) the Council of the *Indies*,
the Council of *Spain*, the Council of *Italy*
and the Low Countries, the Council of War,
the Council of Orders, the Council of In-
quisition, and the Council Royal.

In *France* are three Councils (*viz*) the
Council Privy, the Council of Judges, which
they call *Présidents et Conseillers de Parla-*
ment, and the great Council which they
call *assemblei des trois estates*.

Of Councils in Aristocracies.

In *Venice* beside the Senate and great
Council,

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Council are four Councils (*viz*) the Sages of the Sea, the Sages of the Land, the Council of Tenn, the three presidents of Quarantia, and the Senate: All which Councils do amount to 120 persons, with the Magistrates.

The great Council of *Ragusa* consisteth of 60 persons, and hath another privie Council of 12.

Of Councils in Democracies.

Genova hath 3 Councils; the great Council of 200, the Senate which consisteth of 60, and the privie Council which hath 26 Counsellors: so it doth appear that in all Commonwealths, be they Monarchies, Aristocracies, or Popular States, The Council-privie is most necessarie and often used; Also this difference is to be noted between the Councils in Monarchies, and the Councils in *Aristocracies* and States Popular; that is to say, that all deliberations fit to be published, are in a Monarchie consulted and resolved upon in the Council privie, and after ratified by Common Council; But in Optimacies or popular government the Custom is contrary.

Here also is to be noted that albeit the use and Authority of every Senate and Privie Council

Council is most needful, yet hath it no Authority to command but in the name of those in whom the Sovereignty resteth; for if Councillors had power to command absolutely, then should they be Sovereigns, and consequently all execution at their pleasure; which may not be without detracting from Majestie, which is a thing so sovereign and sacred, as no Citizen or Subject of what quality soever, may touch or approach thereunto.

CHAP. IX.

Of Officers and Commissioners with their respective Distinctions.

AN Officer is a person publick, that hath charge ordinary and limited by Law.

A Commissioner is also a person publick, but his charge is extraordinary and limited by Commission.

Officers are of two sorts, and so be Commissioners; the one hath power to command, and are called Magistrates; the other hath authority to execute: so the one and the other are persons publick: yet are not all publick persons either Officers or Commissioners.

Commissioners are ordained to govern in Provinces, in Warr, in Justice, in disposing the Treasure, or some other Function concerning the State; but all Commissions do spring and proceed from the Sovereign, Magistrates, and Commissioners. And here is to be noted that every Commission ceaseth if he that granted the Commission doth dye, or revoke it, or if the Commissioners during his Commission shall aspire to Office and Authority equall to his that made it.

CHAP. X.

Of Magistrates, their Qualifications and Elections.

A Magistrate is an Officer having power to command in the State; and albeit that every Magistrate be an Officer, yet every Officer is not a Magistrate, but they only that have power to command.

Also in making of Officers and Magistrates in every Commonweale, three things are specially to be observed (*viz*) who doth make them, what men they are that should be made, and the forme and manner how they are made.

The first appertaineth to him or them in
whom

whom the Sovereignty resteth; the second also belongeth to Majesty; yet therein the Laws are commonly followed, especially in *Aristocracies* and States popular; In the one the Magistrates are chosen out of the most wealthy or most noble: In the other, elected out of the whole multitude.

The forme and manner of choosing Magistrates in *Aristocracies* and States Popular, is either by election, by lot, or by both, and their Office is to compel those that doe not obey what Sovereignty commandeth: for all force of Commandment lyeth in compulsion.

Commandment likewise is of two sorts: the one may be called Sovereign and absolute, above Lawes, above Magistrates, and above people. In Monarchies such command is proper to the Prince only; in *Aristocracies* it resteth in the Nobility: and in *Democracies* the people have that power.

The second Commandments are Subject both to Sovereignty and Law:

Here is to be noted that every Magistrate may recall his own Commandment, and forbid what he did Command, yet cannot revoke that which he hath Judged.

* Also, in presence of the Sovereign, all Authority of Magistrates ceaseth; and in presence of great Magistrates the inferior have them.

* Commissions determine in presence of him that granted them.

no power; and Magistrates equall cannot doe any thing but by consent, if his Colleagues or fellow-Magistrates be present.

CHAP. XI.

Observations intrinsically concerning every pullick State in points of Justice, Treasure, and Warr.

THe First concern matter Intrinsick.
The Second touch matter Extrinsick.

Matters Intrinsick are three.

The Administration of Justice.

The Mannaging of the Treasure.

The disposing of things appertaining to War.

Matters Extrinsick are also three.

The skill how to deale with neighbours.

The diligence to vent their designs,

The way how to win so much confidence with some of them, as to be made partaker of whatsoever they mean to enterprise.

Tenching Administration of Justice.

The

The good and direct Administration of Justice, is in all places a Principal part of government ; for seldome or never shall we see any people discontented and desirous of alteration, where Justice is equally administred without respect of persons ; and in every State this consideration is required, but most of all in Countries that doe front upon other Princes, or were lately conquered : Hereunto the Princes vigilancy and the Magistrates uprightness are especially required ; for oftentimes the Prince is deceived, and the Magistrates corrupted ; it behoveth also the Prince to maintain the Judges and Ministers of Justice in their reputation, and yet to have a vigilant eye upon their proceedings, and the rather if their Authority doe include equity, and from their censure be no appeale ; and if their Office be during life, and they are men born and dwelling in the same Country ; all these things are duly to be considered of the Prince, for as to call the Judges into question, is as it were to disgrace the Judicial seate ; so to wink at their corruptions were matter of just discontent to the Subject ; in this case therefore the Prince cannot doe more then by his wisdom to make choise of good men ; and being chosen, to hold them in good reputation so as the ordinary

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course of Justice may proceed; for otherwise great disorder, contempt, and general confusion will ensue thereof. Secondly he is to keep his eye open upon their proceedings; and Lastly to reserve unto himself a supream power of Appellation.

Touching the Treasure.

The want of money is in all States very perilous, and most of all in those which are of least strength, and doe confine upon Nations with whom they have commonly War, or unassured peace, but most perilous of all to those Governments which are remote from the Prince, or place where they are to be relieved.

The means to leave Treasure are four.

First, the Customs and Impositions upon all sorts of Merchandize and Traffique is to be looked unto and advanced.

Secondly, the excessive eating of usury must be suppressed.

Thirdly, all superfluous charges and expences are to be taken away.

Lastly, the doings and accounts of Ministers are severally to be examined.

Touching the matter of Custom and Im-
post,

post, thereof assuredly a great profit is in every State to be raised; chiefly where Peace hath long continued, and where the Country affordeth much plenty of Commodities to be carried out, and where ports are to receive shipping.

The moderating of Interest is ever necessary, and chiefly in this age, by reason that money aboundeth in *Europe*; since the Trafficke into the Indies; for such men as have money in their hands great plenty, would in no wise imploy the same in Merchandize, if lawful it were to receive the utmost usury, being a course of most profit and greatest security.

The taking away of superfluous expences is no other thing then a certain wise and laudable parsimony; which the *Romans* and other well governed States did use. These expences consist in Fees, Allowances, and Wages granted to Ministers of little or no necessity; also in Pensions, Rewards, Entertainments and Donaries, with small difficulties to be moderated, or easily to be suppressed.

*So Henry the 4 of France by putting his Courtiers to board-wages

* By abridging or taking away of these was said needless expences a marvelous profit will be to make saved for the Prince; but if he continue them, money and by imposing upon the people doe think his to increase his Treasure or Renew, be Teeth.

sides the loss of their love, he may also hazard their obedience, with many other inconveniences.

Touching Warr.

Whatsoever Prince or Commonweale is Neighbor to any people which can, will, or were wont to offend, it is necessary to have not only all things prepared for defence of his Person and Country, but also to forecast and use every caution and other diligence: for the inconveniencies which happen to government, are suddain and unlookt for; yea the providence and provision required in this case ought to be such as the expences all other waies employed must stay to supply the necessity of war.

CHAP. XII.

Extrinsick observation, shewing how to deale with Neighbor Princes and Provinces respectively, how to prevent their designes, and decypher their intendments.

THIS first point of matter extrinsick is of such quality as being well handled procureth great good, but otherwise becometh

cometh dangerous; for the proceeding must be diverse according to the diversitie of the ends which the Prince or Governor intendeth; for if he desire to continue peace with his Neighbors, one way is to be taken; but otherwise he is to work that seeketh occasion to break, and to become an Enemy to one or more of his Neighbors. If he do desire to live peaceably with all, then he is to observe these Rules (*viz.*)

First, to hold and continue firmly all contracts and capitulations

Secondly, to shew himself resolved neither to offer nor take the least touch of wrong or injury.

Thirdly, with all care and favor to further Commerce and reciproke traffick for the profit of the Subject, and increase of the Princes Revenue.

Fourthly, covertly to win so great confidence with Neighbors, as in all actions of unkindness among them he may be made Umpire.

Fifthly, to become so well beleaved with them as he may remove such diffidences as grow to his own disadvantage.

Sixthly, not to deny protection or aid to them that are the weakest, and chiefly such as do and will endure his fortune.

Lastly, in Favouring, Aiding, and Protecting

testing (unless necessity shall otherwise so require) to do it moderately, so as they who are to be aided, become not Jealous, and consequently seek Adherency elsewhere, which oftentimes hath opened way to other Neighbors that desire a like occasion.

How to prevent their designs.

This Point in time of War is with great diligence to be looked unto; also in time of Peace to prevent all occasions that may kindle Warr is behoveful; for to foresee what may happen to the prejudice of a Princes Profit or Reputation, is a part of great Wisdom. The means to attain the Intelligence of these things are two.

The First is by Friends, the next by Espials; the one for the most part faithfull, the other not so assured

These matters are well to be considered; for albeit the nature of man desireth nothing more then curiously to know the doings of others, yet are those things to be handled with so great secrecy and dissimulation as the Princes intent be not in any wise suspected, nor the Ministers made odious; for these sometimes to win themselves reputation, do devise causes of difference where no need is, divining of things future which

which prove to the prejudice of their own Prince.

To win Confidence with Neighbours.

This is chiefly attained unto by being Loved and Honored; for these things do work so many good effects, as daily experience sufficeth without any expresse Example to prove them of great force.

The waies to win Love and Trust, is in all Actions to proceed Justly, and sometimes to wink at Wrongs, or set aside unnecessary revenges; and if any thing be done not justifiable, or unfit to be allowed, as oftentimes it happneth, there to lay the blame upon the Minister, which must be performed with so great show of revenge and dissimulation by reproving and punishing the Minister, as the Princes offended may be satisfied, and beleive that the cause of unkindness proceeded from thence.

Now only it resteth that somewhat should be said touching Provision, to the end the people may not be drawn into despaire by Famine or extream Dearth of Victual, and chiefly for want of Corne, which is one Principal Consideration to be regarded, according to the Italian Proverb,
Pane in Piazza, Giustizia in Palazzo, fide

rezza per tutto: whereunto I could wish every Prince or Supream Governor to be thus qualified (viz.) Facile de audienza: non facile de credenza, desioso de spedition, essemplare in costunii proprii, & in quei de suacasa tale che vorra governare, e non esser governato da aliro; ho della ragione.

CHAP. XIII.

Observations confirmed by Authorities of Princes and Principalities, Charactering an excellent Prince or Governor.

EVery good and lawful principality is either elective or successive: Of them, election seemeth the more ancient; but succession in divers respects the better; *Minore discrimine sumitur Princeps quam quaritur. Tac.*

The chief and only endeavor of every good Prince, ought to be the commodity and security of the Subjects, as contrarywise the Tyrant seeketh his own private profit with the oppression of his people. *Civium non servitus sed tutela tradita est. Sal.*

To the perfection of every good Prince, two things are necessarily required

red (*viz*) Prudence and Vertue; the one to direct his doings, the other to governe his life. *Rex eris si recte feceris.* Hor.

The second care which appertaineth to a good Prince, is to make his Subjects like unto himself; for thereby he is not only honored, but they also the better governed; *Facile imperium in bonos.* Plaut.

Subjects are made good by two meanes (*viz*) by constraint of law, and the Princes example; for in all estates, the people do imitate those conditions whereunto they see the Prince inclined; *Quiquid faciunt principes, precipere videantur.* Quintil.

All vertues be required in a Prince, but justice and clemencie are most necessary; for justice is a habit of doing things Justly, as well to himself as others, and giving to every one so much as to him appertaineth; This is that vertue that preserveth concord among men, and whereof they be called good: *Ius & aquitas vincula civitatum:* Cic.

* The author of the Epistle Dedicatory to the Dutchesse of Suffolke, prefixe to Mr. Latimer sermons, saith that

* It is the quality of this vertue also to proceed equally and temperately; it informeth the Prince not to surcharge the Subjects with infinite laws; for thereof proceedeth the impoverishment of the Subjects and the enriching of Lawyers, a kind of men which

Lawyers covet-ouneis hath almost devoured England.

in ages more antient, did seem of no necessity : *Sine cauidicis satis fœlices olim fuisse futuraque sunt urbes. Sal.*

The next vertue required in Princes is Clemency , being an inclination of the mind to lenity and compassion, yet tempered with severity and judgment ; this quality is fit for all great personages, but chiefly Princes, because their occasion to use it is most ; by it also the love of men is gained ; *Qui vult regnare, languida regnet manu. Sen.*

After Clemency, Fidelity is expected in all good Princes, which is a certain performance and observation of word and promise; this vertue seemeth to accompany Justice, or is as it were the same, and therefore most fit for Princes : *Sanctissimum generis humani bonum. Liv.*

As Fidelity followeth Justice , so doth Modesty accompany Clemency ; Modesty is a temperature of reason, whereby the mind of man is so governed, as neither in action or opinion he over-deemeth of himself, or any thing that is his ; a qualitie not common in fortunate folk ; and most rare in Princes. *Superbia commune nobilitatis malum. Sal.*

This vertue doth also moderate all external demonstration of Insolence, Pride, and

Arro-

Arrogance, and therefore necessary to be known of Princes, and all others whom Favor or Fortune have advanced : *Imponere felicitati tue franos, facilius illam reges. CURT.*

But as Princes are to observe the bounds of Modesty, so may they not forget the the Majesty appertaining to their supream honor, being a certain reverend greatness due to princely vertue and royal State ; A grace and gravity no lesse befeeming a Prince then vertue it self ; for neither overmuch familiarity. nor too great austeritie ought to be used by Princes : *Facilitas auctoritatem, severitas amorem minuit. Tac.*

To these vertues we may apply Liberality, which doth not only adorn, but highly advance the honor due to Princes ; thereby also the good will of men is gained ; for nothing is more fitting a Princes nature then Bounty, the same being accompanied with judgment, and performed according to the laws of liberality ; *Perdere multi sciunt, donare nesciunt. Tac.*

It seemeth also that Prudence is not only fit, but also among other vertues necessary in a Prince; for the daily use thereof is in all humane actions required, and chiefly in matters of State and Government. *Pruden-*

tia

via imperantis propria et unica virtus.
Arist.

The success of all worldly proceedings doth shew that prudence hath compassed the prosperous event of humane actions, more then force of arms or other power:

Mens una sapiens plurimum vincit manus.
Eurip.

Prudence is either natural, or received from others; for who so can counsel himself what is fit to be done, needeth not the advice of others; But they that want such perfection, and are nevertheless capable, and are willing to know what others informe, ought to be accompted wise enough: *Laudatissimus est qui cuncta vidit, sed laudandus est is qui paret recte monenti.* Hesiod.

CHAP. XIII.

*Of the Princes intimate Counsellors
and Ministers of State, with their
several Requisites.*

ALbeit the excellent spirit of some Princes be such as doth justly deserve the highest commendation; yet for that every course of life needeth the aid of men, and the

the mind of one cannot comprehend the infinite care appertaining to publick affairs; it behooveth Princes to be assisted: *Magna negocia, adjutoribus egent. Tac.*

These assistants may be properly divided into Counsellors and Ministers; the one to advise, the other to execute: without Counsel, no Kingdom, no State, no private house can stand; for, experience hath proved that Common weals have prospered so long as good counsell did governe but when favor, fear, or voluptuosness entred, those nations became disordered; and in the end subject to slavery: *Quiddam sacrum profecto est consultatio. Plato.*

Counsellors are men specially selected to give advice to Princes or Commonwealths, as well in peace as in war: the chief qualities required in such men, are Fidelity and Knowledg; which two concurring do make them both good and wise, and consequently fit for Counsel; *Prudentis proprium manus rectè consulere. Arist.*

The election of Counsellors is and ought to be chiefly among men of long experience, and grave years; for as youth is fittest for action in respect of corporal strength; so elder folk having felt the force of every fortune, and observed the course of worldly proceedings do seem most meet for consul-

tation : *Consilia senum, facta juvenum. Plaut.*

Albeit we say that the excellency of wisdom should be in Counsellors ; yet do we not require so quick and fiery a conceipt as is more apt for innovation then orderly government. *Hebetiores quàm acutiores melius Remp. administrant. Thucyd.*

To Fidelity and Experience we wish that our Councillors should be endued with Piety, Liberty, Constancy, Modesty, and Silence ; for as the aid and assistance of God is that which governeth all good counsels, so liberty of speech and magnanimus uttering of what is good and fit, is necessary in Counsellors. Likewise to be constant and not to varie in opinion, either for feare or favor, is very commendable : Also as modesty in giving Counsel escheweth all offences, and gaineth good will ; so secrecy is the best and most secure meanes to govern all publick affairs : *Res magna sustineri non possunt ab eo qui tacere nequit. Curt.*

The first obstacle to good Counsel is Pertinacy or Opiniativeness, a condition far unfit for Counsellors, yet some men are so far in love with their own Opiniastre conceipts as that they cannot patiently endure opposition. Secondly, Discord must from Counsellors be removed, because private offence
many

many times impeacheth publick proceedings. Thirdly affection is an enemy to counsel, the same being commonly accompanied with anger, wherewith nothing can be rightly or considerately done. Lastly Avarice seemeth a vice worthy to be abhorred of all Counsellors because it driveth away both Fidelity and Honesty, the principall pillars of all good counsell : *Pessimus veri affectus et judicii venenum, utilitas. Tac.*

To good Counsell other impediments there are, which square not with wisdom; for all crafty and hazarding Counsells do seem in the beginning likely to succeed; but afterwards and chiefly in the end do prove hard and of evil event. It therefore seemeth behovefull to be wary in resolving, and bold in executing : *Animus vereri quis scit, scit tunc aggredi. Pub.*

An other let to good consultation is immoderate desire, which every wise man must endeavor to restrain. *Cupiditate pauca recte sunt, circumspectione plurima: Thucyd.*

Thirdly haste, is an Enemy to good deliberation, for whoso greedily desireth any thing, proceedeth rashly; and rash proceeding endeth ever in repentance. *Sceleris impetu, bona consilia mora valent. Tac.*

Of Ministers of State.

Having already spoken of Counsellors, somewhat is to be spoken of Ministers ; I mean those that either publicly or privately serve the Prince in any function; in choice of which men, care must be had , First that they be person honestly born ; for no man descended of base parentage may be admitted , unless in him be found some noble and excellent vertue ; *Optimus quisque Nobilissimus. Plato.*

— Secondly, they ought to be of honest condition, and of good fame; for that commonweal is better and more secure, where the Prince is not good, then is that where his Ministers are evill. It seemeth therefore that Ministers should be men of good quality and blamelesse. *Emitur sola virtute potestas. Claud.*

Thirdly, consideration is to be had of their Capacity and fitness for that Function wherein they are to be used ; for as some men are apt for learning, so others are naturally disposed to arms. Also it is necessary that every one square with the office whereunto he is appointed, in which matter some Princes have used great caution ; for as they little liked of men excellent, so they utterly

ly detested the vitious; the one they doubted to trust in regard of themselves, the other were thought a publick indignity to the State. VVise men have therefore resolved that those witts which are neither over haughty and singular, nor they which be base or dull are fittest for Princes secrets and services; howsoever we may hereof say with *Tacitus* : *Nescio quomoda Anlica hac comitia affectus dirigit, et fato quodam ac sorte nascendi, ut cetera, ita principum inclinatio in hos, offensio in illos est. Tac.*

And because the course and quality of mens lives serving in Court, is of all other the most uncertain and dangerous, great heed and circumspection ought therein to be used; for whoso serveth negligently forgetting the dutifull endeavors appertaining to the place, seemeth to take a way of no good speed : *Quanto quis obsequio promptior, tanto honoribus et epibus excolitur. Tac.*

It shall also become such a man to look well unto his own profit and behave himself rather boldly then bashfully : *Malus minister Regii imperii pudor. Sen.*

To be modest, and closely to handle all actions; is also a course well beseeming a Courtier; neither shall he do well to attribute any good success to his own vertue or

merit, but acknowledg all to proceed from the Princes bounty and goodness, by which meanes envy is eschewed, and the Prince not robbed of his honor. *Hac est conditio Regum, casus tantum adversos hominibus tribuant, secundos virtuti sua. Prov. Emped.*

And to conclude these precepts summarily, I say it behooveth a l ministers and servants in Court to be patient, wary and of few words: *Frandum sedes Au'a. Sen.*

CHAP. XV.

The Art of ruling, or Mystery of Regiment.

TO governe, is a certain skill how to command and continue Subjects in due obedience, so as offend they ought not, or if they will they cannot; wherein two speciall things are to be considered (*viz*) the nature of Men, and the nature of the State; but first the condition of the vulgar must be well conceived; *Noscenda natura vulgi, et quibus modis temperanter habeatur. Tac.*

The disposition of divers men is, some are apt to anger, some are hardy, some fearful; it therefore behooveth the Prince to accommodate his government to the humor of people

people whom he governeth : *Principis est
virtus maxima nosse suos. Mart.*

Likewise the nature of Commonweals
is mutable and subject to change, and Kings
are not only accompanied with fortune, but
also followed with hate, which breedeth a
continuall diffidence, chiefly towards those
that are nearest to Majesty : *Suspectus sem-
per invisusque dominantibus quisquis prox-
imus destinatur. Tac.*

Moreover the vulgar sort is generally va-
riable, rash, hardy, and void of judgment ;
*ex opinione multa, ex veritate pauca nascitur.
Cic.*

To confirm a Government, force and
armes are of greatest necessity ; by force
I mean the guards and armes which Princes
use for their defence or ornament ; *Miles in
foro, Miles in curia principem comitari debet.
Tac.*

To this may be added fortification and
strong buildings, in these days much used
by new Princes, and others also to whom
people yield, not willing obedience. In an-
cient times Princes planted Colonies as well
to suppress rebellion in conquered Coun-
tries, as to front suspected neighbors : *Colo-
nia vera sedes servitutis. Tac.*

The government of Princes is also greatly
increased by a vertue, which I call a com-
men-

The Cabinet-Council.

mendable affection in Subjects, proceeding of love and authority : These effects do grow from the Princes own merit, but their being liveth in the mind of the People ; this love is gained by lenity, liberality, and mercy ; yet is every of them to be tempered : *Nec aut reverentiam terrore, aut amorem humilitate captabis Plin.*

Affection is also no way sooner won then by liberality, the same being used with Judgment and Moderation. *Bellorum sociis, periculorum consortibus, sive de te bene ac fortiter — meritis. Sen.*

By Indulgence likewise and Princely affability the love of men is gained ; for the multitude desire no more then necessary food, and liberty to use ordinary recreations: *Vulgo, sicut pueris, omne ludicrum in pretio est. Sen.*

CHAP. XVI.

Of Princely Authority ; wherein it consists, and how far to be extended and delegated.

Authority is a certain reverent impression in the minds of Subjects and others touching the Princes virtue and govern-
ment ;

ment; it resteth cheifly in admiration and fear - *Ingenita quibusdam gentibus erga reges suos veneratio. Curt.*

Authority consisteth in three things; (*viz*) the form of Government, the strength of the Kingdom, and the condition of the Prince; for in them all reputation and security resteth: *Majestas imperii, salutis tutela. Curt.*

Whoso desireth to governe well, it becometh him to use severity, constancy, and restraint; for over much lenity introduceth contempt, and certain hope of impunity; the condition of men being such as cannot be restrained by shame, yet it is to be commanded by fear: *Salutaris severitas vincit inanem speciem clementie. Cic.*

Yet ought severity to be used with great respect and sparingly, because over great terror breedeth desperation: *Pœna ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat. Cic.*

To governe constantly is nothing else but to continue the old and antient laws in force without change or innovation unles exceeding great commodity or urgent necessity shall so require: for where extream punishments are used, reformation is always needfull; *Noceat interdum priscus rigor & nimia severitas. Tac.*

Also to restrain Authority is a matter of
great

great necessity and worthy a wise Prince; else he maketh others partakers of the honor and power to himself only due, the same being also dangerous: *Periculosum privati hominis nomen supra (immò & juxta) principes extolli. Tac.*

It seemeth also perilous that great Authority given to private men should be long; for thereby oftentimes they are made insolent and apt to innovation: *Libertatis sive principatus magna imperia diuturna esse non sinas. Liv.*

Authority is also reinforced and enlarged by power, without which no Prince can either take from others or defend his own: *Parum tuta sine viribus majestas. Liv.*

CHAP. XVII.

Of Power and Force; and how to be raised and maintained.

Power and Stength is attained by these five ways, Money, Armes, Counsell, Friends and Fortune; but of these the first and most forcible is money: *Nihil tam munus quod non expugnari pecuniâ possit. Cic.*

Next to money armes are of most use, as well to defend as to offend; to keep, as
to

to conquer; for oftentimes occasion is to be offered as well to take from others, as to hold what is our own: *Sua retinere privata est domus, de alienis certare Regia laus est.*

Tac.

Also of great and necessary use is Counsell, to devise how Arms ought to be employed or enforced: *Arma concilio temperanda.* *Tac.*

Likewise Friends and Confederates do greatly increase the vertue of power, the same being such as have both wit and ability to aid: *In caducum parietem ne inclina:* *Adri.*

The last, yet not the least part of power, consisteth in Fortune; whereof daily experience may be seen; for the success of all humane actions seem rather to proceed from fortune then vertue. *Omni ratione potentior fortuna.* *Curt.*

To these particularities concerning power, we may add the qualities of the Prince, which greatly grace his authority; these are partly internal and partly external: by the one I mean the vertues of the mind, by the other a certain seemly behavior and comly gesture of the body; of the first kind I do suppose piety and providence to be the chief, for piety maketh a Princk venerable, and like unto God; *Oportet*

*portet principem res divinas videri curare
serio & ante omnia. Arist.*

Providence is a forecast and likely conjecture of things to come, supposed to be in those Princes that in their actions proceed slowly and circumspectly, it seemeth also a course of Princely discretion to be retired and not ordinarily to converse with many : *Autoritatem absentia tenere. Suet.*

CHAP. XVIII.

*Of Conspiracy and Treason ; with the
Causes and ways of prevention or
discovery.*

CONSPIRACY is commonly addressed to the Princes person ; Treasons are addressed against his Government, Authority, Country, Subjects, or places of strength. These Mischiefs are easily feared, but hardly eschewed, for albeit open Enemies are openly encountred, yet Fraud and Subtilty are secret foes, and consequently not to be avoided : *Occulta pericula neque praevidere neque vitare in promptu est. Salust.*

The danger of conspiracy preceedeth of divers causes, as Avarice, Infidelity of Subjects, Ambition in Servants, and corruption

ruption in Soldiers, therefore with great difficulty to be avoided: *Vita mea dominus est, quisquis suam contempsit. Sen.*

Notwithstanding it seemeth that either by Inquisition, Punishment, Innocency, or Destiny, the evill affection of men may be oftentimes discovered: 1. For whoso will curiously inquire and consider the actions and ordinary speeches of men (I mean those that be persons of honor and reputation) may oftentimes vent the Myne that lurketh in the minds. *Quoniam raro nisi male loquuntur male faciunt. Lips.*

2. Punishment is likewise a thing so terrible that the consideration thereof with the hope of reward doth often discover those dangerous intentions: *Cruciatu aut premio cuncta pervia sunt. Tac.*

But as it is wisdom in Princes to give ear to informers, so are they not always to be believed; for Hope, Envy, Hate, or some other passion oftentimes draws them to speak untruly. *Quis innocens esse potest si accusare sufficit? Tac.*

3. The third and likeliest defence against conspiracy is the Princes own Innocency; for never having injured any man, it cannot be thought there liveth any Subject so lewde as will endeavor to hurt him.

him. *Fidelissima custodia principis ipsius innocentia. Plin.*

4. The last and best bulwark to withstand the force of this mischief we call destiny ; which preceeding from the Fountain of divine providence, may be truly called the will of God ; in whose only power it resteth to protect and defend good Princes. *Ille erit à latere tuo, & custodiet pedem tuum ne capiaris. Salo.*

。 Treasons are most commonly enterprized by covetous persons, who preferring private profit before fame or fidelity, do not fear to enter into any impious action : To this humor ambitious men, dissentious, and all such as be desirous of Innovation, are inclined : *Pulcra loquentes iidem in pectore prava sentientes. Hom.*

To these Offenders no punishment as equal to their impious merit, can be devised, being persons odious as well to friend as foes : *Proditores etiam in quos anteponunt, invisunt. Tac.*

CHAP. XIX.

*Of publick Hate and Contempt, with
the occasions and means to redress
and avoid it.*

HAVING briefly touched the Vertues and Means whereby Princes are maintained in Authority and Honor, let something be said of the causes from whence their ruine doth proceed; the cheif whereof seemeth to be Hate and Contempt: Hate cometh of Feare, which the more Common it is, the more Dangerous. *Nulla vis imperii tanta est, qua premente metu possit esse diuturna.* Cic.

The causes of Feare are Punishments, Impositions and Rigor; and therefore it behooveth a Prince not only to shun them, but to eschew those actions whereby he may reasonably incur their suspicion. *Sentias enim homines ut metuant aut oderint, non minus opinione & fama, quam certa aliqua ratione moveri.* Cic.

Yet Punishment, Imposition, and Censure are in all States necessary, although they shew and seem terrible, and consequently breed a certain desperation in Subjects, unless they be discreetly and modestly used;
for

for extreme and frequent punishments taste of cruelty; great and many imposts favour of Covetousness; censure of manners when it exceedeth the quality of offences, doth seem Rigor in these matters, therefore it behooveth the Prince to be moderate and cautelous, chiefly in Capital Punishment, which must be confined within the bounds of Justice. *Sic apud principem parsimonia etiam vilissimi sanguinis. Sen.*

But if for securitie sake the Prince be forced to punish, let the same be done with shew of great sorrow and lothness: *Tanquam invitatus & magnocum tormento ad castigandum veniat. Sen.*

Let all punishments also be slowly executed; for they that are hastily punished do seem to have bin willingly condemned; neither ought any Capital Punishment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the Commonweale, and for example sake. *Non tam ut ipsi pereant, quam ut alios pereundo deterreant. Sen.*

In punishing also a special respect must be had, that no shew of content or pleasure be taken therein. *Forma rabiei est sanguine & vulneribus gaudere. Sen.*

Also in punishing equality must be observed, and the nature of the punishment according to the Custom. *Nec eisdem de causis alii*

alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur quidem.
Cic.

But in punishing publick offences wherein a multitude have part, the execution ought to be otherwise, and as it were at an instant, which may haply seem terrible, but in effect is not. *Frequens vindicta paucorum odium reprimat, omnium irritat.* Sen.

Another meanes to satisfie a people offended is to punish the Ministers of cruelty, and with their blood to wash away the common hatred. *Piaculares publici odii victimae.* Plin. By this King David did appease the Gibeonites.

The next cause of discontent cometh of Impositions under which word is comprehended all levies of money, a matter nothing pleasing to people, as that which they esteem equall to their own lives. *Pecunia anima & sanguis est mortalibus.* Plant.

First, to remove hate conceived of this cause, there is nothing better then publick expostulation of necessity: for what Commonwealth or Kingdom can be without Tributes? *Nulla quies gentium sine armis, nec arma sine stipendiis, nec stipendia sine Tributis haberi queunt,* Tac.

The second remedy against Hate for impositions is to make moderate Levies and rare. For as *Tiberius* the Emperour was wont

to say, a Sheep should be fleeced not Head.
Qui nimis emungit, elicit sanguinem. Tac.

Thirdly, also to eschew the offence of People it behoveth the Prince to have a vigilant eye on Informers, Promoters, and such fiscal Ministers, whose cruelty and covetous proceedings do oftentimes occasion great hate; but this mischief may be, though hardly, encountred, either by choosing honest Officers, or (proving otherwise) not only to remaine them but to use them as sponges, *Exprimendi postquam biberint. Suet.*

In all impositions or Taxations, no cruelty or force ought to be used, the second cause to kindle hate: and to meet with that mischief, nothing is better then to proceed moderately, and without extremity. *Ne Boves ipsos, mox agros, postremo corpora servitio aut pœna tradant. Tac.*

The fourth remedy is the Princes own parsimony, not giving so largely to private persons as thereby to be forced to take from the multitude. *Magna opes non tam multa capiendo, quam haud multa perdendo, queruntur. Macenas.*

The last help against hate is in taxation to proceed equally, indifferently, and without favor or respect; and that the Assessors of Taxes may be elected of the meaner sort of people. *Populus maximam fidem rerum suarum habet. Tac.*

Touching

Touching Censure, which we numbred amongst the causes whereof hate is conceived, much needeth not to be spoken, because the same is discontinued, or rather utterly forgotten; yet doth it seem a thing necessary, being a certain observation and controlement of such evill manners, and disorders as were not by Law Corrigible; these Officers were of the *Romans* called *Magistri pudoris & modestie*. *Livi.*

To the Function of Censures these two things are anciently subject Manners, and Excess; Under Manners I comprehend Wantonness, Drunkenness, Dicing, Brawling, Perjury, and all such Lewdness as Modesty condemneth. These disorders were anciently punished by the discretion of Censors in all Ages and Sexes, to the end that Idleness might be generally avoided. *Vniversa plebs habeat negotia sua, quibus à malo publico detineatur. Salust*

Excess includeth Riotousness, expence of Money. Prodigal housekeeping, Banqueting, and Superfluitie in Apparel, which things are the mothers of many mischeifs. It also seemeth in some sort perillous to the Prince that the Subject should exceed either in Covetize or Consuming. *Nemo nimis excedat, sine amicorum copiâ, sine opum. Arist.*

The punishment inflicted upon these sorts

of offenders, were either Ignominy, or Pecuniarie punishments, *Censoris iudicium damnato nihil affert nisi ruborem. Tac.*

The first and chiefeſt meanes to remove theſe inconveniences, is the Princes own example, whoſe life being well cenſured, eaſily reduceth others to order. *Viſa principis cenſura perpetua. Plin.*

Secondly, Thoſe diſorders may be taken away without danger, if the Cenſures doe proceed by degrees and leaſurely; for the nature of man may not ſuddenly be altered. *Viſa quadam ſollis facilis princeps, ſi eorum ſit patient. Sen.*

Theſe are the cheiſeſt rules whereby to eſchew hate; but impoſſible it is for any Prince or Miniſter utterly to avoid it; for being himſelf good, he incurreth the offence of all bad folk: if he be evil, good men will hate him; this danger therefore Wiſe and Vertuous Princes have little regarded: becauſe hate may be gained as well by good as evil doing. *Odia qui nimium times, regnare neſcit. Sen.*

One other meanes to remove this error, is, to reward the good and well deſerving Subjects; for no man can think him cruell that for love to Vertue uſeth Auſteritie: which wil appear when he beſtoweth bountifully on the good. *Premio & pœna Reſpublica continetur. Solon.* The

The other Vice which indangereth the State of Princes, we call Contempt, being a certain base and vile conceipt, which entereth into the Subjects, strangers or servants, of the Prince and his Proceedings; for the Authority of a King may be resembled to the powers of mans mind, whereunto the hands, the feet, the eyes, do by consent obey. *Vires imperii in consensu obedientium sunt Livi*

The causes of Contempt do proceed chiefly from the form of Government, Fortune, or the Princes manners; the form of Government becometh contemptible, when the Prince desiring to be thought merciful, ruleth rather pittifully then justly: which manner of proceeding taketh away all reverence in the people, and in lieu thereof entereth liberty, or at least a certain boldness to offend; *Facultas faciendi quod cuilibet visum, non potest comprimere ingentem singulis hominibus pravitatem. Tac.*

Also to be Mutable, Irresolute, light and Inconsiderate in bestowing the Honors and Offices of State, maketh the Prince contemptible; *Qui presentibus fruitor, nec in longius consultat. Arist.*

But if contempt be caused by Fortune, or as may be said more reasonably, by destiny, and that those friends do fail who ought in

duty to defend the Prince and his Authority, then is there small hope to eschew contempt. *Fato obnoxia virtus. Plaut.*

The Princes manners do breed contempt, when he yeildeth his affections to sensuality and sloth, or if he incur the suspicion of Simplicity, Cowardise, or any such Vice, unworthy the Dignity he beareth: Common people do sometimes also disesteem the Prince for external and light causes, as deformity of person, sickness or such like. *Mos vulgi est, fortuna & externa ad culpam trahere. Tac.*

CHAP. XX.

Of Diffidence and Dissimulation in the mannage of State Affairs.

ALbeit roundness and plain dealing be most worthy praise, chiefly in private persons; yet because all men in their actions do not so proceed, it behooveth Wise Men and Princes above others at occasions to seemle and dissemble; for as in all actions a Prince ought to be slow and advised; so in consent and beleiving haste and facility is most dangerous; and though credulity be rather an error then a fault, yet

yet for Princes it is both unfit and perilous. Wherefore it importeth them to be defended with this caution, *Nihil credendo, atque omnia cavendo. Cic.*

Notwithstanding he must not shew himself diffident or distrustful utterly; but as I wish he should not over-slightly believe all men, so ought he not for small causes distrust every man. *Multi fallere docuerunt, dum timent falli. Sen.*

Diffimulation is as it were begotten by diffidence, a quality in Princes of so great necessity as moved the Emperor *Tiberius* to say, *Nescit regnare, qui nescit dissimulare.*

The necessity of diffimulation is chiefly to be used with strangers and enemies: it also sheweth a certain discretion in Magistrates sometimes to disguise with friends when no offence doth thereof follow. *Doli non sunt doli, nisi astu colas. Plaut.*

This kind of craft albeit in every mans concept not praisable, is nevertheless tolerable, and for Princes and Magistrates (the same being used to good ends) very necessary. But those cunningings which are contrary to vertue, ought not of honest men to be used: neither dare I commend Adulation and Corruption; though they be often used in Court and are of some learned writers
E 4 allowed.

allowed. *Decipere pro moribus temporum, prudentia est. Plin.*

By great subtiltie and frauds contrary to Vertue and Piety, I mean Perjury and Injustice, which though all men in words detest, yet in deeds are used of many, perswading themselves by Cavillations and Sophistications to excuse the impiety of their false Oathes: as it is written of *Lysander, Pueros talis, viros juramenti circumvenire solebat. Plut.*

CHAP. XXI.

*Of Warr Defensive and Invasive:
with Instructions touching Laws of
Armes, Soldiers, and Military Dis-
cipline.*

THE Art Military is of all other qualities most necessary for Princes; for without it they cannot be defended; force of men only sufficeth not, unless the same be governed by Council, and Martial Wisdom. *Duo sunt quibus resp. servatur; in hostes fortitudo, & domi concordia. Tac.*

Military knowledge concerneth Warr, and every Warr is either Forreign or Domestical. Touching Forriegn it must be considered

sidered when it must be begun, how to continue it, and when to be ended; to begin War, a Prince is, to take heed that the cause be just, and the enterprize advisedly entred into. *Sunt enim & belli sicut pacis iura, justique ea non minus ac fortiter gerere debes.*
Liv.

The Laws of Arms are in all Commonwealths to be duly observed: for to enter fight rashly and without respect to reason, were beastly; also to kill or slay would work no better effect, then that all Nations should without mercy murder one another; *Barbaro ritu cædem cæde, & sanguinem sanguine expiare. Sal.*

No Warr therefore is to be made but such as is just. And in every just War these three things are to be looked into (*viz*) that the Author be of Authority, that the cause be good, and the end just; for in all States, the Prince, or they in whom the Sovereignty resteth, are the just Authors of Warr: others have no such Authority. *Si quis privatim sine publico scito, pacem bellumve fecerit, capitale esto. Plato.*

Warrs are of two sorts: Defensive and Offensive; the one to resist, the other to invade; against defence nothing can be said, because it is natural and necessary. *Est non modo justum sed etiam necessarium cum vi vis illata defenditur. Cic.*

Defensive

Defensive Warr is of two sorts, either to defend thine own, or thy friends; for it is reason that every one should keep securely that which to him appertaineth: and therewith also by Arms to defend the liberty of Country, Parents, and Friends. *Nullum bellum à civitate suscipitur nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute. Cic.*

The like reason leadeth us to assist and protect friends: for the common obligation of humane society doth so require. *Qui enim non obstitit si potest, injuria. tam est in viti, quam si parentes aut patriam, aut socios deserat. Cic.*

Invasion is also just and allowable, but not ever; for who so hath bin robbed, or spoiled of his Lands, or Goods, may lawfully seek repossession by force: yet so, as before any force be used, he first civilly seek restitution, wherein if Justice be denied, then is the use of Arms necessary: *Iustum bellum quibus necessarium; & pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes. Liv.*

Likewise invasion is lawfull against Barbarians, whose Religion and Impiety ought to be abhorred, chiefly if they be potent and apt to offend; for the cause of such Warr is compulsion and suppression of evil. *Cui licentia iniquitatis eripitur, utiliter vincitur. August.*

Finally,

Finally, To conclude this matter of invasion, I say, That no revenge, no desire of Honor or Empire, are any lawful causes of War; but the intent thereof ought to be directed onely to defence and security: For Wise men do take arms to win Peace, and in hope of rest they endure travel. *Stabilium suscipiatur ut nihil aliud quam pax quaesita videatur. Cic.*

Having said somewhat against unjust War, let us speak of temerity and unadvised War, an enterprize worthy discommendation. *Omnes bellum sumunt facile, agerrimè desinunt; nec in ejusdem potestate initium & finis est. Sal.*

A wise Prince therefore ought neither to undertake any unlawful invasion, nor without sober and mature deliberation enter into any War, as he that is unwilling to offend, yet of courage enough to defend. *Nec provocas bellum, nec timeas. Plin.*

To make War, three things are required. Money, Men, and Arms; and to maintain a War, Provision and Council are needful: Therefore a wise Prince before he begins a War, doth carefully consider what forces and charge thereunto belongeth. *Diu apparandum est bellum, ut vincas melius. Pub.*

Above all other Provisions, care must be had,

had, that Bread be not wanting; for without it, neither victory nor life can be looked for. *Qui frumentum necessariumque com-
mentum non praparet, vincitur sine ferro.*
Vegetius.

Lastly, it behoveth a Prince always to have Arms in readines, I mean, Harness, Horses, Weapons, Artillery, Engines, Powder, and every other thing necessary either for service on Horse or Foot: We may adde hereunto Ships, and Shipping of all sorts, with every furniture of offence or defence; for these preparations make a Prince formidable, because no man dare do or attempt injury to that King or people where preparation is ever ready to revenge. *Qui desiderat pacem, praparat bellum.*
Cass.

By men we mean a multitude of Subjects armed, trained to defend or offend: These are of two sorts, Captains and Soldiers; and Soldiers are either Footmen or Horsemen, the one of great use in the Champion, the other in Mountainous places; also for defence or assault of Towns or Grounds fortified most necessary, and consequently meet for service in all places, which moved *Tacitus* to say, *Omne in pedite robur, Tac.*

For sudden service, Horses do seem most
meet,

meet, and the execution of any enterprise is by them most speedily performed: Nevertheless the actions of Footmen do seem more certainly executed, chiefly if they be well armed, and skilfully led; for so experience hath of late time proved; besides, that they are of less expence and of greater number. *In universum aestimanti plus in pedite robur: Tac.*

Having thus proved, that both Horse and Foot be necessary; let us remember, that unless they be serviceable, great numbers are to small purpose. *Manibus opus est bello, non multis nominibus, Livi.*

To make Soldiers serviceable, consisteth in good choice and good Discipline; the one at this day little regarded. *Emunt militem, non legunt. Livi.*

Soldiers ought to be elected out of the most honest and able number of Bodies; and every Company composed of men known one to the other; for thereby they are made the more confident: But hereof is small heed taken; for commonly they are *Purgamenta urbium suarum, Curt.*

Touching Discipline, it seemeth that thereof the external Form, and not the certain Substance, is observed: For as in former ages, Soldiers endeavored to be virtuous and modest, so now they rather study

to excel in Riot, then in Martial knowledge.
*Exercitus lingua quam manu promptior,
 pradator est sociis, & ipse prada hostium.
 Sal.*

For as much as Soldiers are made good by election and choice, it seemeth that the foundation and ground of service consisteth in the discretion and judgment of those that have authority to make Election; yet will we adde, that they must be chosen of natural Subjects, for strangers are covetous, and consequently corruptible; they are also mutinous and cowardly: Their custom likewise is to rob, burn, and spoyle both friends and foes, and to consume the Princes treasure. *Ossa vides regum vacuis exsucta medullis. Juven.*

But the Native Soldier is faithful and obedient, resolute in fight, loving to his Countrey, and loyal to his Prince. *Gentes quæ sub regibus sunt, pro Deo colunt. Curt.*

Native Soldiers are of two sorts, (*viz.*) They that be in continual pay, and they that are trained ready to serve, but do notwithstanding attend their own private affairs, until they be called: The first are for all Princes necessary. *In pace decus, in bello præsidium. Tac.*

Of this sort no great number ought to be, as well to eschew disorder, as also to
 save

save expences. The second kinde of foot Soldiers are to be levied in Villages, as people more patient of pains, and fit for the Wars; yet so judiciously disposed as the Citizens. *Odio presentium & non cupidine mutationis. Tac.*

Touching the number of these extraordinary Soldiers, that must be referred to discretion: *Bellum parare, simul & arario parcere.*

To conclude, I say these numbers of ordinary and extraordinary foot ought to be according to the number of the people, not inserting any Gentlemen; for service on horse-back is to them onely proper. *Alas rusticis non tribuo; in nobilitatem & in divites hac à pauperibus onera inclines. Livii.*

The most certain notes whereby to conceive the disposition of men fit to become Soldiers, are these five. The Country where they are born, their age, proportion of body, their quality of minde, and their faculty. Touching

First, The Countrey, it is a thing apparently proved, that Mountainous Regions, or barren places, and Northern habitations do breed wits well disposed to the War. *Locorum asperitas hominum quoque ingenia durat. Curt.*

Secondly, The Age most apt for the War,
was

The Cabinet-Council.

was anciently observed to be about eighteen years, and so the Romans used. *Facilius est ad virtutem instruere novos milites, quàm revocare prateritos. Veget.*

Thirdly, The stature of a Soldier ought to be observed : *Marinus* liked best the longest Bodies ; *Pyrrhus* preferred large and well proportioned men ; but *Vegetius* in his choice, rather esteems strength then stature : *Utilius est fortes milites esse quàm grandes. Veget.*

Fourthly, The Minde or Spirit of a Soldier ought to be considered ; for that Minde which is quick, nimble, bold, and confident, seemeth apt for War : He is also of good hope, that loveth honor more then ease or profit : In brief, *Is qui nihil metuit nisi turpem famam. Sal.*

Lastly, it is to be marked in what art or faculty a man hath been bred ; for it may be presumed that Fishers, Fowlers, Cooks, and others trained up in effeminate arts are unfit for Martial endeavor : And as these men were in respect of their trade thought unmeet ; so in old time, slaves and masterless men were repulsed from arms, as persons infamous. *Sed nunc tales joca nuntiantur atque quales Domini habere fastidiunt. Veget.*

How Soldiers ought to be chosen, these few words we have spoken, may suffice. Let

us therefore say somewhat of Discipline. Choice findeth out Soldiers, but Discipline doth make and continue them fit for service. *Paucos viros fortes natura procreat, bona institutione plures reddat industria Veget.*

Discipline is a certain severe confirmation *Disci-* of Soldiers in their Valor and Vertue, and *plins.* is performed by four means, Exercise, Order, Compulsion, and Example. The two first appertain to Valor, the third to Vertue, the last to both: But of Exercise, first, I say, That a Soldier being chosen, ought to be informed in Arms, and used in Exercise and Action; the word *exercitium* importeth nothing else. *Exercitius dicitur, quod melius fit exercitando. Varro*

Order consisteth in dividing, disposing, and placing of men aptly at all occasions to be commanded, as the Leaders shall direct: This matter requireth a large discourse, and therefore I refer it to skilful Captains and Writers, as *Polybius, Vegetius, De la Noue*, and others.

Compulsion and Correction, is that which bridleth and governeth the manners of Soldiers: For no order can be observed amongst them, unless they be continent, modest, and abstinent; for continency is chiefly to be shewed in their diet, and mode-

rate desires. *Degenerat à robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum. Tac.*

The Modesty of a Soldier is perceived by his Words, Apparel, and Actions: For to be a vaunter, or vain-glorious boaster, is far unfit in him that professeth Honor or Arms, seeing true Vertue is silent. *Viri militie nati, factis magni, ad verborum lingueque certamina, rudes. Tac.*

The Apparel of a Soldier sheweth modesty, if therein he do not exceed; for albeit it fitteth well the Profession of Arms, to be well armed and decently apparelled; yet all superfluity favoreth of ignorance or vanity. *Horridum militem esse decet, non celatum auro argentoque sed ferro. Livi.*

Abstinence is also fit for all Soldiers; for thereby guided, they refrain from violence, and insolency; by that rule also they are informed to govern themselves civilly in the Country where they serve, and likewise in their Lodgings: Never taking anything from the owner, nor committing any outrage. *Vivant cum provincialibus jure civili, nec insole scat animus qui se sensit armatum.*

The last mark of Discipline we called Example, under which word is Comprehended reward and punishment: For men are rewarded whensoever they receive for any excellent or singular Service, Honor or Riches.

Riches. And for Evil, they have their due when they taste the punishment thereunto belonging. *Necessarium est acrius ille dimittet, quem ad opes & dignitates ordo militiae & imperatoris iudicium consuevis euehere. Veget.*

Likewise as Gold and Glory belongeth to good and well deserving Soldiers; so punishment is due to those that be vicious and cowardly, for nothing holdeth Soldiers in obedience so much as the severity of discipline. *Milites imperatorem potius quam hostem metueri debent. Veg.*

CHAP. XXII.

Of Generals and Commanders, and their requisite Abilities in Martial enterprises and expeditions.

OF Soldiers let this little suffice, we will now speak of what quality Cheiftants and leaders ought to be, for upon them dependeth the welfare of whole Armies. *Militaris turba sine duce, corpus sine spiritu. Curie.*

A Cheif or General in Warr, is either of his own Authority cheif, or a general that commandeth in the name of another. Of the

first sort are Emperors, Kings, and Printes ; of the other, be their Deputies, Lieutenants, Collonels, and indeed all generall Commanders in the War: Now whether it be more expedient that the Prince should command in person or by deputy, divers wise men have diversly thought, therefore it may be be thus distinguished; if the War do then only concern some particular part or Province, then may the same be performed by a Lieutenant; but if the whole Fortune of a Prince do thereupon depend, then is he to command in his own person and not otherwise. *Dubius bellorum exemplis summa rerum & imperii seipsum reservat. Tac.*

- It therefore importeth the Prince sometimes by his own presence, sometimes by his deputation to performe that Office: but however occasion shall require, it ever behoveth that one only commander ought to be; (for plurality of Cheiftaines doth rarely or never worke any good effect) yet with this caution that he be of experience, and wise. *In bellica praefectura major aspectus habendus peritia quam virtutis aut morum. Arist.*

The qualiries required in a Cheiftaine are these, Skill, Vertue, Providence, Authority, and Fortune By skill we meane he should be of great knowledge, and long experience

perience or to make a sufficient Captaine; the information of others, or his own reading is not enough. *Qui norit quis ordo agminis, qua cura exploandi, quantus urgendo trabendove bello modus. Cic.*

Military vertue is a certain vigor or force both of body and minde to exercise Soldiers aswell in fained war as to fight with the Enemy; and summarily a Captain ought to be *Laboriosus in negotio, fortis in periculo, industrius in agendo, celeris in conficiendo. Cic.*

Next to vertue we placed providence as necessary in great Captains; for being of such wisdom they will not hazard nor commit more to fortune then necessity shal inforce; yet true it is, fools and vulger folks that commend or discommend actions according to success, were wont to say: *Cunctatio servilis; statim exequi, Regium est.* But advised and provident Captains do think; *Temeritas praterquam quod stulta, est etiam infelix. Livi.*

Albeit providence be the best mean of good speed; yet some Captains of that quality and in skill excelling, have bin in their actions unlucky; when others of less sufficiency have marvellously prevailed; we may therefore reasonably say with, *Cic. Quod olim Maximo, Marcello, Scipini, Mario & ceteris magnis*

nis Imperatoribus non solum propter virtutem, sed etiam propter fortunam sapimus imperia mandata, atq; exercitus esse commissos. Cic.

Lastly, we wished authority to be in Cheiftains; for it greatly importeth what opinion or conceipt the Enemy hath of such a Governor, and likewise how much his friends and confederates do esteem him: but the cheif and only means to maintain Authority, is Austerity and Terror. *Dux Auctoritatem maximam severitate sumat, omnes culpas militares legibus vindicet, nulli errantium credatur ignoscere. Veget.*

Also experience hath proved that such Cheiftains as were affable and kind to their Soldiers, were much loved, yet did they incur a contempt: but on the other side those that commanded severely and terribly, although they gained no good will, yet were they ever obeyed: *Dux facilis inuictus. App.*

CHAP. XXIII.

*Of Councils in War, and directions
Tactik and Stratagematik : with ad-
vice how to make an honorable
Peace.*

After men found and framed fit for the
Warr, to small or no purpose shall
they serve, unless they be imployed by wis-
dom or good Council. *Mon minus est Im-
peratoris consiliis quam vi perficere. Tac.*

Council in War is of two sorts; direct
Council and indirect; the first sheweth a
plain and orderly course for proceeding, as
to lay hold on occasion: for as in all other
human actions occasion is of great force;
*Occasio in bello solet amplius juvare quam
virtus. Veget.*

As occasions presented are means of good
success; so fame worketh great effects in
the Wars, therefore it behooveth a Cap-
tain to be constant, and not apt to beleive
the vain rumors and reports of men. *Male
imperatur, cum regit vulgus duces suos.
Sen.*

Confidence is also to be eschewed; for
no man is sooner surpris'd, then he who
feareth less: also contempt of the Enemy

hath bin occasion of great discomfitures, therefore as a Captain ought not to fear, so should he not contemn his Enemy. *Nimia fiducia semper obnoxia. Amyl.*

As security, and overmuch estimation of our own vertue or valor is hurtfull: so doth it import every good Captain to be well informed not only of his own forces, but also of what strength the Enemy is; likewise it behooveth him to know the situation of the Country and the quality of the people, with every other circumstance. Moreover the Generals honor and capacity ought to be known with the condition and nature of the Enemy. *Impetus acres cunctatione languescunt, aut in perfidiam mutantur. Tac.*

Temerity in War is also dangerous; for wise Captains were wont not to enterprise any thing without deliberation and good opportunity, unless they were thereunto by necessity inforced. *In rebus asperis & tenui spe, fortissima quaq; consilia tutissima sunt. Livii.*

Some wise men not superstitiously but discreetly do think prodigious signes from Heaven or on Earth are not to be neglected, neither are dreams in time of War to be contemned. *Nam amat benignitas numinis, seu quod merentur homines, seu quod tangunt.*

*itur eorum affectione, his quæque rationibus pro-
dere qua impendent. Ami.*

A wise Captain will also wait oportuni-
ties and spy out fit times when the Enemy
is wearied, or pretending fear, draw him
into danger; which advantages with many
other, are gained chiefly by observing of
time; *Quia si in occasione momento. cujus
prætervolat oportunitas, cunctatus paulum
fueris, nequicquam mox omissem querere.
Lini.*

Next the observation of Time, the Place
is to be well considered, whether it be for
thine advantage or thine enemies. *Amplius
prodest locus sapè quàm virtus. Veget.*

Thirdly, It importeth much, that men be
well ordered, trained, and prepared for the
fight; for the want of Art is cause of
many disadventures, and many times a small
supply of choice Soldiers on horsback or
foot, doth seem to the enemy very terri-
ble: Likewise a sudden shout or conceit
hath amazed a whole Army. *Milites vanis
& inanibus, magis quàm justis formidinis
causis moventur. Cuvr.*

Fourthly, It were to good purpose, that
in ordering of men for fight, Soldiers of
one Country or Nations, should be ranged
together, and above all to foresee, that the
least loss of Blood be among the Natural
Subjects,

Subjects, and so handle the Matter, that the cheif slaughter light upon strangers and Mercenaries. *Ingens victoria decus, citra domesticum sanguinem bellanti. Tac.*

The Generals own courage and lively disposition to fight, will greatly animate the multitude of Soldiers; as a contrary countenance or appearance of Fear, will exceedingly maze and dant. *Necesse est ad fugam parati sint, qui ducem suum sentiunt desperare. Veget.*

It were also for thy great advantage, that the forces should be ordered for the fight, before the enemy be prepared.

First, For that thou maist the better perform, what thou thinkest fit to be done.

Secondly, That thereby thine own forces will thereof receive great courage, being readiest to assail the enemy, and to begin the fight. *Plus animi est inferenti periculum, quam propulsanti. Livi.*

After Victory it is not the best policy to execute the enemies with extream cruelty, but proceed moderately; for it shall suffice the Victory is thine. *Clausis ex desperatione crescit audacia. & cum spei nihil est, sumit arma feruido. Veget.*

Lastly, I would advise that the General should be wary in his Actions, and in every enterprise to frustrate the Soldiers from spoils and pillage. *Sape obstitit vincentibus*

pravum

pravum inter ipsos certamen, omisso hoste spolia consecrandi. Tac.

Of direct Councils, let that we have said suffice. We will now speak of Councils indirect, commonly called by the Greek word, *Stratagems* or *Subtile practices*: Which manner of proceeding, hath been in times past of divers grave Writers condemned. *Vir xemo mentis alta clanculum velit occidere hostem. Eurip*

Notwithstanding the opinion of this, and divers other Writers worthy credit, it seemeth reasonable, and in piety allowable: that Stratagems and Subtilties may be used in the War, yet with such Caution as the same may stand with Fidelity and Honor: For Fraud being used contrary to Contracts and Agreements made with the enemy, is meer Treachery: As to poyson him or her, a murderer to kill him, were plain Impiety. *Federatum injustè fallere impium. Livi.*

Also out of the War covertly to kill a particular enemy by secret Assault or Practice, is not warrantable, either by Faith or Honor; yet to use all craft, cunning, and subtilty in open War, is both allowable and praisable; and so is thought by Christian Writers. *Cum justum bellum suscipitur, ut aperte pugnet quis aut ex insidiis, nihil ad justitiam interest. Aug.*

The

The same is also approved by divers Authors of good credit. *Confice sine dolo seu stricto cominus ense.* The same is also affirmed by *Xenophon, Reipsa nihil utilius in bello dolis.*

Thus having briefly touched what Counsels are required in War, let us consider how Victory is to be used; for the end of every good War is Peace: To the enjoying whereof, three things are required, Wariness, Mercy, and Modesty; because overgreat confidence may happily impeach the end of good Success. *Res secunda negligentiam creant. Livi.*

I also wish the Victory to be handled mercifully, because all Conquests are in their own nature cruel enough. And the Ire of insolent Soldiers, forces the conquered to become desperate. *Gravissime morsus irritata necessitatis. Curt.*

To proceed Modestly, is also an honorable quality in him that conquereth: For in prosperous Fortunes, men do hardly refrain covetous and proud doings; yea, some good and great Captains have in like cases forgotten what did best become them. *In rebus secundis etiam egregii Duces insolebant. Tac.*

After Victory followeth Peace: For if War did ever continue, no State or Government

ment could stand: Therefore how great, or how long soever the War be, the end must be Peace; the name whereof is not onely sweet, but also comfortable, *Pax unatrimphus innumeris potior.*

Peace is not only good and profitable to him that is victorious, but also to those that are victored. *Pacem reduci velle victori, expedit, victo necesse est. Tac.*

Nevertheless until good and honorable Peace be offered, Arms may not be laid aside: Wherein I wish *Tullies* advice to be followed. *Bellum gerendum est; si bellum omittimus, pace nunquam fruemur. Livii.*

In Treaty of Peace, two things must be considered: First, That the conditions be honorable. To condescend to any base conditions, is unto a Princely minde not onely great indignity, but also intolerable. *Cum dignitate potius cadendum, quam cum ignominia serviendum. Plut.*

It also importeth, the Peace should be simple, true, and unfeigned; for all feigned and dissembling Amity is to be doubted. *Pace suspecta tutius est bellum. Mithrid.*

The fittest season to speak of Peace, is either when the War beginneth, or during the time that the enemies be of equal force; for if the war continueth, it must behove the weaker to yield to necessity: Not unlike

like the Shipmaster, who to save himself doth cast the greatest part of his loading into the Sea: *Necessitati pare, quam ne dii quidem superant. Livi.*

Finally, Having generously defended thy self, and performed all things required in a magnanimous Captain. and finding nevertheless thy force insufficient, it cannot be dishonorable to accept Peace. Wherefore laying aside Hatred and Hope, which are but weak supporters, thou maist recommend thee and thine to the approved discretion of an honorable enemy. *Victores secundæ res in miserationem ex ira vertunt. Livi.*

Now for as much as every Peace promiseth rest and quiet, as well to the victorious as to the victored; we may adde thereunto, that the Prince victorious receiveth thereby Honor, Profit, and Security. For although his happiness may occasion Hope of greater success, yet in respect of Fortunes mutability, it shall be good and glorious to listen to peace. *Decorum principi est cum victoriam propè in manibus habeat, pacem non abnuere. ut sciant omnes te & suscipere justè bellum & finire. Livi.*

It seemeth also the more Honorable; for who so is victorious, doth give Peace and not take it: He also sheweth himself discreet by using a moderation in Victory, and

and no extremity in spoiling, which our wise and godly Writers have commended: *Pacem contemnentes, & gloriam appetentes, pacem perdunt & gloriam. Bern.*

Peace is also profitable for the victorious, because continual War breedeth weariness, and of violent proceeding desperation and peril cometh. *Maximi & mortiferi morsus esse solent morientium bestiarum. Sen.*

Likewise Peace is more assured then any victory. Hope of the one is in thine own power; the other in the hand of God: Adde thereunto the force of Fortune, which hath great power in all humane actions. *In rebus secundis nihil in quenquam superbè ac violenter consulere decet, nec presenti credere Fortune, cum quid visper ferat, incertum sit. Sen.*

Also conditions of Peace ought to be reasonable and freely bestowed: For no people can live contented under such a Law as forceth them to loath the State wherein they are. *Misera pax bello benè mutatur. Sen.*

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Civil War, with the causes and Remedies thereof.

THE greatest and most greivous calamity that can come to any State is Civil War; for therein Subjects take arms against their Prince or among themselves; whereof followeth a misery more lamentable then can be described. *Non atas, non dignitas quenquam protegit, quo minus stupra cadibus, & cades stupris misceantur. Tac.*

The first cause of Civil War proceedeth of destiny. for God in his own divine providence foreseeeth many years before, that great and mighty Empires shall be ruined:

In se magna ruunt: latis hinc numina rebus Crescendi posuere modum ——— Lucan.

The second cause is, excesse, riot, and dissolute life; for nothing breedeth Civil Fury so soon as over great happiness; also pompous Apparell, banquetting and prodigall spending consumeth riches, and plenty is turned into poverty; for by these means are men brought into desperation. *Rapacissimo enique ac perditissimo, non agri aut fanni*

senus sed sola instrumenta vitiarum manebunt. Tac.

Now to consider how destiny might be eschewed, were in vain : For such a remedy no wit or wisdom can devise, being the decree of God, no doubt it is inevitable. *Ita fato placuit, nullius rei eodem semper loco stare fortunam. Sen.*

There is nothing exempt from the peril of mutation ; the earth, Heavens, and whole World is thereunto subject. *Certe enim cuncta temporibus, nasci debent, crescere, extingu. Sen.*

Touching the second causes of Civil War some remedies may be used, because it proceedeth of Faction, Sedition or Tyranny. I call Faction a certain association of divers persons combined to the offence of others. It proceedeth often of private or publick displeasure, and more often of ambition. *Nemo eorum qui in Rep. versantur, quos vincat, sed à quibus vincatur, aspicit. Sen.*

1. Factions are of two sorts ; for either they consist of many or of few persons : both be dangerous, but the former more apt to take arms ; and that party which proveth weakest, prayeth arms of forrain forces.

2. The other faction wherein are fewer partakers, be commonly great personages

or men of more importance than ordinary people ; and that proveth most perillous and bloody. *Nobilium factiones trahunt ad se, & in partes, universum etiam populum: Arist.*

Albeit some wise men have held opinion that factions are necessary, yet cannot that concept be reasonably maintained, unless it be upon confines and in such places where conspiracy is feared; which Cato in his private Family used; *Semper contentiunculas aliquas aut dissensum inter servos callide serebat, suspectam habens nimiam concordiam orum, metuentemque. Plut.*

Factions amongst the Nobility, are sometimes suppressed by forbidding colors, or unknown badges to be worn; also to inhibit names or watch-words of mutinies is necessary, which was *Mecenas* counsel to *Augustus*; and *Aristotle* thinketh it fit that Laws should be made against the Factions of Noblemen. *Nobilium contentiones & partes etiam legibus oportet prohibere conari. Arist.*

Another cause of civil war, we call sedition, which is a suddain commotion or assembly of common people against their Prince or his Magistrates: the Original of which disorders may proceed of divers causes, but chiefly of oppression. *Imminentium periculorum remedium, ipsa pericula arbitrari. Arist.* Again,

Again, Fear may be the occasion of Sedition, as well in him that hath done injury, as in him that looketh to be injured, and is desirous to prevent it before it cometh. It may proceed also of over great mildness in Government. *Non miseriis sed licentia, tantum concitum turbatum, lascivire magis plebem quam scire. Livi.*

Sedition many times ariseth of Poverty, or of the Artificers, whose Arts are grown out of use, and consequently no means whereof they can live. *Semper in civitate, quibus opes nulla sunt, bonis invidenti, vetera odere, nova expetunt, odio rerum suarum mutari omnia student. Sab.*

Lastly, Sedition cometh of Tyranny, Insolency, or Mutinous disposition of certain Captains, Cavaliers, or Ringleaders of the people: for albeit the multitude is apt to innovation, yet doth it stand firm, until some first mover taketh the matter in hand. *Multitudo omnis, sicut mare, per se immobilis. Livi.*

Of these Movers some are Ambitious, who wanting other means to aspire, hope by practice of Sedition, to compass their designs; or else they are Unthrifts, who having consumed their own, seek by violence to possess themselves of other mens: Or else they are vain and light persons, that

without cause or reason, attempt innovation, themselves know not for what. *Non tam premisi periculorum, quàm ipsis periculis latè, pro certis & olim partis, nova, ambigunt, accipitis malum.*

Thus having told the causes of Sedition, I wish the remedies were prepared. *Omne malum nascenti facile opprimitur, inveteratum fit plerumque robustius. Cic.*

The first way to suppress Sedition, is Eloquence and excellent perswasion, which oftentimes worketh great effects among the multitude; chiefly when it proceedeth from some reverend and grave person, for his wisdom and integrity of life honored: For the Prince himself is not to take this office in hand, unless necessity so inforce: *Integra autoritas principis majoribus remediis servitur. Tac.*

If perswasion cannot prevail, then force must compel: But before such violent proceedings, use art and cunning either to appease the people, or at least to disunite them; and rather if the Prince do offer fair and promise plausibly: *Verba apud populum plurimum valent. Tac.*

It is lawful also in such cases for Princes to use subtilty; and the same not prevailing, to wash away the stain thereof with Clemency: For when Arms are laid down, and every

every one yielded, general punishment were needless. *Omnium culpa fuit, paucorum se pœna. Tac.*

The last cause of Sedition we named Tyranny, which is a certain violent Government, exceeding the Laws of God and nature. The difference between Kings and Tyrants is this; the one imployeth arms in defence of Peace, the other useth them to terrifie those of whom his cruelty hath deserved hate: *Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudinem fecerint, pacem appellant. Tac.*

The quality of Tyrants is to esteem Promooters more then good Ministers, because those men are the scourge of infinite others. They are also Protectors of impious persons, and stand in daily doubt of Noble and Vertuous Men. *Nobilitas, opes, amissi gestique honores, pro crimine: Et ob virtutes certissimum exitium. Tac.*

Tyrants do also endeavor to suppress the knowledge of Letters and civil life, to the end all good arts should be exiled, and Barbarism introduced. *Pellunt sapientia professores, & omnes bonas artes in exilium argunt. Tac.*

These and such like, be the conditions of Tyrants, who for the most part are deposed and slain; for as Kings live long and

deliver their Dominions to their Children and Posterity; so Tyrants being feared and hated of all men, cannot continue in their estate.

Ad genus Cereris sine corde & vulnere pauci

Descendant reges & sicca morte Tyranni. Juven.

The Remedies of these Mischeifs which proceed from the violence of such a Prince, are Persecution or Patience. Many generous spirits have used the first; perswading themselves rather to die, then endure the sight of a Tyrant. Also the *Grecians* did think it a service acceptable to murder the person of such an impious Prince. *Graci homines deorum honores tribuebant iis qui Tyrannos necaverunt. Cic.*

Nevertheless, in Christian consideration the other course is to be taken: Let patience therefore incounter this mischeif; for seeing all Kings, as well the bad as the good be sent by God, they must be indured. *Res est gravis occidere regalem stirpem. Homer.*

Persecution is not onely perilous, but for the most part infortunate: For thereof present revenge is taken by that Prince that succeedeth. *Facinoris ejus ultor est, quisquis successerit. Tac.*

The murder of Tyrants is also followed
with

with many inconveniences worse then civil War it self. *Principes boni, votis expetendi, qualescunque tolerandi. Tac.*

For as Fire, Floods, and other inevitable Plagues are necessarily to be suffered: So evil Princes in their covetousness and cruelty ought to be patiently indured, because their office is to command, and subjects must obey. *Indigna, digna habenda sunt, Rex que facit. Sen.*

And as it is the use of vulgar people to finde faults in the long reign of Princes; so the ambition of great Subjects is desirous of novelty. *Præsens imperium subditis semper grave. Thucyd.*

To conclude, we say that the best remedy against Tyranny, is Patience: For so long as men are, so long will Vices be. *Regum ingenia toleranda, neque usui crebra mutationes. Tac.*

CHAP. XXV.

*A Collection of Political Observations
(confirmed by Reason and Experience)
advertising Princes, Statesmen,
and private Persons how to demean
themselves in all Fortunes and E-
vents.*

TO the perfections of Men, three things are necessarily required; Nature, Nurture, and Use: The first giveth capacity, aptness, and understanding; which are graces from above. Nurture, is learning, knowledge, art, or order. Use, is practice, experience, and orderly observation; whereof may be conceived, that Nature alone sufficeth not; nor can Nurture work any good effect, where natural aptness wanteth; and they can frame no perfection, unless experience be also conjoyned. *Nemo nascitur sapiens, sed fit. Sen.*

Ambassadors, Negotiants, and generally all other Ministers of mean fortune, in conversation with Princes and Superiors, must use great respect, shewing themselves rather ceremonious then presumptuous, and acknowledge their obligation great, for the favor

favor and grace, they hide in thole which might command them.

It is no wisdom ever to commend or discommend the actions of men by their success; for oftentimes some enterprises attempted by good Counsel, end unfortunately; and others unadvisedly taken in hand, have happy success. Who so then commendeth inconsiderate Counsels for their fortunate event, thereby encourageth men to jar and discomfort the wiser sort to speak what they know, and by experience have proved.

In Actions publick and every other matter of great moment, the beginning is well to be considered: For afterwards it lieth not in our power, without dishonor to abandon what was begun.

The time doth not always serve, nor is apt occasion always offered to enterprise what we would; yet who so doth expect every opportunity, shall either attempt nothing at all, or if he do, the same for the most part turneth to his own disadvantage.

When any resolution is taken, either with over-great haste, or too much affection, seldom it receiveth good success: For he that doth the one, hath no leisure to consider; the other transporteth the minde so as it cannot

cannot conceive more then that which presently presseth.

To these we adde others, I mean some of them that have leisure, and are void of affection, yet for want of natural capacity, or for continual negligence in their doings, never bring any thing well to pass.

Who so desireth to be beloved in a Commonwealth, must rest content with that which men do give, and the Laws allow him to take: So shall he neither incur danger nor envy; for indeed, that which is taken or extorted from others, and not that which is given, doth make men hated.

Arms, Laws, and Religion, may not in any well governed State be dis-joyned; for every one of them in particular maintaineth them all united.

In actions of War, courage and conduct are of great necessity; yet all good Government consisteth in using the Vertues Moral; and in handling the matter of Martial Policy, it is fit to imitate the proceedings of antient and approved Captains.

Among Mortal Men, there is nothing more common then to believe the estate of one man to be better then another; for hereof it cometh, that every one endeavoreth rather to take from others with travel, then to enjoy his own with rest.

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The state of Princes is good being well used ; so is the fortune of private men, if therewith they be contented. The rich-man liveth happily, so long as he useth his riches temperately ; and the poor man that patiently endureth his wants, is rich enough.

Whensoever a man is so dangerously distressed, as either proceeding or standing, he liveth in like peril, then doth it behove him in any wise, to resolve upon action. The reason is, that so long as nothing is done, the same accidents that caused his dangers, do still remain in their former force ; but if he endeavor to enterprise somewhat, either he may meet with means to make him secure, or at the hardest, shew himself of so great courage and wit, as he dare and can attempt a way to do it.

It seemeth a thing of great difficulty, or rather impossible for any Prince or Magistrate to eschue the evil spech and bad report of men ; for if they be good and vertuous, then they incur the backbiting of leud persons ; if evil, then will all good men exclaim against them.

All Commonwealths ought to desire peace, yet it is necessary ever to be prepared for the war ; because peace disarmed, is weak, and without reputation : Therefore

fore the Poets reign, that *Pallas* the Goddess of Wisdom did always appear armed.

Every Prince (well advised) ought to govern his Subjects and Servants in such sort, that by his affability and vertue they may be induced rather to serve voluntarily, then for pay or hope of preferment. For otherwise doing, whensoever the Prince shall want means to pay, the Subjects likewise will fail of good will to serve. But he that faithfully loveth, doth neither in prosperity become arrogant, nor in contrary Fortune retire, or complain of the small favor he findeth: For (till death) love and life remain at the Princes Commandment.

Where poor men finde Justice, evil men are punished, Measures and Weights be just, Youth well nurtured, and old folk free from avarice, there is the Commonwealth good and perfect.

In War between Neighbors, neutrality is commendable; for by that means we eschue many troubles and great expences, so long as the forces of either side be so equal in strength, as we need not to fear the victory of any: For so long their discord is our security, and oftentimes offereth us means to increase our own state and reputation.

The cheif reasons to move War, are, the
Justice

Justice of the Cause, the Facillity of Success, and the Profit of the victory.

In all Humane actions it behoveth to accommodate the Council of Men unto present necessity, and never to expose security to manifest peril, nor hope of that which without great difficulty or impossibility cannot be obtained.

It is the nature of men having escaped one extream, which by force they were constrained long to endure, to run headlong into the other extream, forgetting that Vertue doth always consist in the mean.

The multitude is inclined to innovation, and easily induced by false perswasion, and consequently easily transported by seditious leaders.

Men are naturally disposed to fear those things which threaten danger and terror; yet unless these perils by some new accident be daily revived, that fear by little and little vanisheth, and security recovereth the place.

Whoso findeth himself contemned, or not respected, becometh discontent; which humor in generous mindes, breedeth oftentimes advenferous imaginations, whereof audacious attempts have followed, chiefly in persons of authority and reputation; for he that hopeth no good, feareth no evil: Yet true is it, that dangerous enterprises, the
more

the more they be thought upon, the less hope they give of good success, for which reason conspiracies not suddainly executed are for the most part revealed or abandoned.

All people do naturally imitate the manners of their Prince, and observing his proceedings resolve to hate or love him: But if they happen once to hate the Prince, then his doings, good or evil, are afterwards not good; but if at the beginning he gained the love of the people, then every bad action is reputed a vertue: as though he could not be induced to do amiss without good cause or reason.

Greatly are Princes deceived if in the election of Ministers they more respect their own particular affection, then the sufficiency of the person elected.

A Prince having conquered any new Dominion, is thereby rather incombred then strengthened, unless the same be after well governed; and seldom is it seen that a principality by ill means gotten, hath bin long enjoyed.

As to the perfection of the whole body soundness of head only sufficeth not, unless the other members also do their office; even so it is not enough that a Prince be faultless, but it behooveth also that the Magistrates
and

and Ministers should perform their duty.

Great Princes rarely resist their appetites, as for the most part private men can: for they being alwaies honored and obeyed, do seldom with patience indure the want of any thing reasonable, as being perswaded that what they desire is just, and that their Commandment hath power to remove all difficulties.

All men are naturally good when no respect of profit or pleasure draws them to become evill. But this worlds corruption, and our frailty is such, as easily and often for our particular interest we incline to the worst; which was the cause that wise Law-makers found out reward and punishment: the one to incite men to good, the other to fear them from being evill.

*Tam bene quam male fac-
ta pre-
munt.
Mart.*

A Tyrant indeavoreth to maintain his Estate by three means. First, he practiseth to hold all Subjects in extream awe, and to be basely minded, to the end they should want courage to take arms against him. Secondly, he kindleth diffidence and discord among the great men; thereby to remove occasion of conspiracy and combination. Lastly, he holdeth them disarmed and idle, so as they neither know nor can attempt any thing against him

To govern, is nothing else but to hold
Subjects

Subjects in love and obedience: for in respect of the end, they ought not, and in regard of the other they cannot attempt any thing contrary to the governors will and their duty.

The Laws and Ordinances of a Commonwealth made at the beginning thereof when men were good, do often prove unprofitable when they are become evill; and therefore new Laws are made according to the accidents which happen.

The discontent or disorder of people is ever occasioned by the inequality of their goods, because the poorer sort would be made equall to the rich: but the offence that grows among great men is the desire of honor; for they being equal, do indeavor to aspire to equall authority.

A Prince that desireth by means of his Ambassador to deceive an other Prince, must first abuse his own Ambassador, to the end he should do and speak with more earnestness, being indeed perswaded that the intent and meaning of his Master is simple which happily would not, were he privy that his Princes meaning were to dissemble. This course is also commonly holden by those that by imployment of a third person would perswade any thing fained or false

For the performance of conditions in
treaty

treaty of Peace or League of Amity, the Promises, Vowes, and Oathes of Princes are of great effect; yet because fidelity in a man is not ever certain, and time doth daily offer occasions of variation, there is no assurance so secure and good as to stand so prepared as the Enemy may want able means how to offend.

To resolve in matters doubtfull, or answer requests which we are not willing to grant, the least offensive way is not to use direct denial, but by delaies prolong the time and so in place of effect, afford good expectation.

The old Proverbe saith; *Magistratus virum ostendit*: which is no less true then ancient: for men in such fortune are occasioned not only to make proof of their sufficiency, but also to discover their affections; and the more their greatness is, the less respect they have to contain those passions which are natural.

Albeit great troubles and continual adversity seem insupportable; yet is there nothing more dangerous, then ouermuch prosperity; and being pressed by new appetites, they disturb their own security.

In speaking of occurrents doubtfull, it is alwaies wisdom to feign Ignorance; or at least alledge that we beleive then not: for

most commonly they are utterly untrue, or far other then vulgarly is believed.

The Actions of men are commonly liked or disallowed according to the bad or good success: attributing that to Council which sometimes is due to fortune.

The multitude of men were wont to be more pleased with suddain then slow resolutions; and many times accompt those enterprises generous, which are rashly and inconsiderately attempted.

Great difference there is between Subjects desperate, and others which are only discontented: for the one desire nothing but present alteration, which they indeavor with all hazard: the other wish for innovation, inciting any motion or practice, because their intent is to attend time, and that occasion may present it self.

A benefit bestowed on him who thinketh himself greatly injured, doth not suffice to raze the same out of his memory, cheifly if the benefit be given at such time as no meer motion but necessity may seem the occasion thereof.

That Peace ought to be desired which removeth suspition, which assureth us from perill, which bringeth quiet certain, and acquitteth us of expences: But when it worketh contrary effects, it may be called
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a dangerous war covered with the name of deceitfull trust, not unlike a perillous poyson ministred in lieu of a wholsom Medicine.

The effect of things, and not externall show or seeming, ought to be regarded; yet it is incredible what great grace is gained by courteous speech and affability: the reason whereof is as I suppose. that every man beleiveth he doth merit more then indeed he is worthy, and consequently holdeth himself injured when soever he findeth men not to afford him like estimation.

Men ought in any wise, to refrain to doe or say any thing which may offend, for which respect it were great folly either in presence or absence to utter displeasing speech unless necessity inforceth.

The matters whereof Councillors are cheifly to consider, be five. The Princes revenue, Peace and Warr, Defence, Traffick, and what Laws are to be made.

In giving Council divers things are to be observed; but amongst them are two of most importance. First, it behooveth, that he who is Counsell'd should be wise; for seeing Council is nothing else but a certain considerate discourse of things to be done or not done, if he who is to take Council be not of discretion, then will he refuse all good advice offered, and rather incline to

that which his own fancie affecteth, because the want of Judgement draweth him to take pleasure in vain things ; and as one incapable of what is good and true, will follow that which is evill and false : so on the other side if he that giveth Council be not faithfull, then will he a Thousand waies disguise and dissemble the truth, and consequently miscarry the mind of him that is Counsell'd: yea in the end utterly abuse him.

The affairs and proceedings of the world are so variable and accompanied with so many chances and changes, as impossible it seemeth to judge what is best : therefore experience enformeth, that the conjectures of the most wise prove vain and uncertain. I therefore mislike the Judgment of those men, that will let slip opportunity of present good (though it be small) for feare of a future evill notwithstanding it be greater, unless the evill be very near at hand, or certain. For if that doe not follow which is feared, then wilt thou repent to have omitted that which was desired.

Whensoever a general opinion is conceived of the singular vertue and knowledge of any man, although he be indeed ignorant and far unworthy that accompt, yet it is hard to remove such a settled conceipt:
the

the reason is, that men having at the first given credit to common report, do make thereof so deep an impression as afterwards without great difficulty cannot be removed.

The Bodies of Men, Munition, and Mony may justly be called the sinews of War, yet of them the two first are more necessary, for Men and Arms have means to find Mony and Meate: but Mony and Meate cannot so easily find Soldiers and swords.

One wise Generall having but a Thousand men, is more to be feared and esteemed then twenty Commanders of equall Authority: for they being commonly of divers humors, or judging diversly, do never, or very rarely what is to be done, and consequently lose much time before any resolution can be taken

A Prince of mean force ought not in any wise to adventure his Estate upon one daies fight: for if he be victorious he gaineth nothing but glory: but if he lose, he is utterly ruined.

The most part of men are delighted with Histories, for the variety of accidents therein contained: yet are there few that will imitate what they read, and finde done by others; being perswaded that imitation is not only hard but impossible, as though the Heavens and Men were changed in their

The Cabinet-Council.

Motion, or Order, and Power, which they anciently had.

The Nature of men is such as will not endeavor any thing good, unless they be forced thereunto : for where liberty aboundeth, there confusion and disorder follow. It is therefore supposed that Hunger and Poverty make men industrious : but good Lawes inforce them to be honest, for if men were of themselves good, then Laws were needless.

There are two kinds of Adulation : The First proceedeth from a subtil malice : The Second cometh by an ordinary use of conversation ; the one tendeth to profit and deceiving ; the other hath no further design then a respect or fear to offend. Whereunto the most honest are in some sort bound. Whoso bindeth himself to flattery, doth thereby bewray his intent, either to gain, or not to lose that he hath. For the person flattered is alwaies superior to him that doth flatter, or at least one as may in some sort stand him in stead. It may therefore be inferred that only men of base and miserable condition, and such as cannot help or hurt, be free from flatterers. And contrariwise magnanimous and fortunate folke, proud men and such as content themselves with their present estate, are seldom found to be flatterers. Every

Every wise Prince doth presuppose that times of trouble may come, and that all such occasions he shal be forced to use the service of men diversly qualified. His study therefore is in the mean time so to entertain them as when those storms arise he may rest assured to command them ; for whosoever perswades himself by present benefits to gain the good will of men, when perills are at hand, shall be deceived.

In ancient times Princes and Governors were wont when peace and security were most like to continue, to find or faine occasions to draw their Subjects to fear, to the end that doubt might move them to be more carefull of their own welddoing ; for well they knew it a general defect in men to be reachless, and never willing to use industry ; unless by necessity they were constrained.

All Histories do shew, and wise Polititians do hold it necessary, that for the well governing of every Commonweal it behooveth to presuppose that all men are evil, and will declare themselves so to be when occasion is offered ; for albeit some inconvenience doth lie hid for a time, it proceedeth from a covert occasion, which for want of experience was not found untill time the Mother of Truth discover it.

Neutrality is always a thing dangerous and disallowable, because it offendeth all parties: He that is strong looketh to be assisted in his greatness; and he that is weak not being defended, holdeth himself offended: the one is not assured from Foes, and the other holdeth no friends.

Albeit neutrality procure present quiet and security, during the troubles of others; yet after the same falleth out a disadvantage, because it entertaineth a certain falseness, and so in short space will be perceived, not unlike those men that borrow upon usury; for albeit they enjoy a certain time, without trouble or charge, yet the same being spent, and the day of payment come, they then feel the great danger which their short pleasure hath purchased.

Whoso examineth all humane actions shall find that in eschewing one inconvenience, we presently incur another. As for example, if we endeavor to make our dominions mighty, it behooveth to have the same fully replenished with people, and well armed, and so being, they are not easily governed. On the other side, if our Country be not well peopled, or disarmed, then it is easily holden in obedience; yet therewith so weak that it can neither increase the bounds thereof, nor defend it selfe. It is therefore necessary
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in all our deliberations to consider what inconvenience is least, and choose that, as the best : for to find all perfect, void and secure of suspect or imperfection, is impossible.

A Prince being instantly required to take part with other Princes, the one being in arms against the other, if he deny both incureth suspicion of both, and may be thought to have secret intelligences with one or both of them ; so as either of them shal account him an enemy, and consequently he that proves victorious will be revenged ; and the other holding him suspected will not acknowledge his Friendship.

It is the use of men to presume much upon their own merit, and seeing the success of some others to be such as without cause or desert are aspired to dignity thereby uncouraged they promised to themselves the like : Nevertheless being entred into the course of their design, and finding many crosses and impeachments, they do not a little repent their over-weening and presumption, but also many times utterly abandon their rash and unadvised enterprize ; neither can I think that the vertue or sufficiencie of any man without the favor of the heavens can advance him ; for as the Poet saith, *Nec velle juvat, potiusque nocet, si fata repugnant.*
Who-

Whoso serveth a Prince far from his presence, shall with great difficulty content him. For if he commit any error, it shall be aggravated: besides that the instructions sent unto him cannot be particularly conceived, because the State of worldly things doth daily alter. Also to serve aloofe, is a thing full of danger and far from reward: which inconvenience may for the most part be avoided by him that attendeth near to his Princes person.

Let no man that cometh to serve in Court, assure himself by his wisdom to be advanced or eschew all encounters. Neither is he to bear himself so careless as to commit all to fortune, but be perswaded that this wordly life is like to a voyage by Sea; wherein albeit Art with the favor of the wind may do much, yet can we not assure our selves to arrive safe in the Haven appointed; for daily experience doth shew, that some strange ships in the calmest weather, are drowned or impeached by the way, when others much weaker and disarmed passe securely.

Among men worthy of commendations, those have merited best that first planted true Religion: next they that framed Kingdoms and Commonwealths; the third place is due to such as have augmented or enlarged

larged their dominions; lastly learned men deserve fame and memory : and as every of these are worthy of fame and honor, so ought they to be accompted infamous that introduce Atheism, or the subversion of kingdoms, or are become enemies to Learning and Vertue.

Whosoever taketh in hand to governe a Multitude either by way of liberty, or principality, and cannot assure himself of those persons that are Enemies to that Enterprise, doth frame a State of short perseverance : yet true it is that such Princes be infortunate, as for their own security are inforced to hold a course extraordinary, and have the multitude their enemy ; for he that hath few foes may with small dishonor be assured ; but he that is generally hated can by no means live assured ; and the more cruelty he useth, the weaker his principality proveth.

In commending another man great moderation is to be used ; for as contumely offendeth him against whom it is used ; so great praise, besides that it is uttered with danger to his judgment that speaketh it, the same doth oftentimes offend him that heareth it. For self love which commonly possesseth men, causes the good or evil we hear, to be measured with our own. And
confe-

consequently every man that is touched with like defects and defects, doth grow offended that his commendation is not set forth, and feareth lest his imperfection should be discovered.

It is often, or rather ever seen, that the force of Leagues not used in their first heat, becomes cold; because Suspicion soon entereth which in short space will destroy whatsoever was concluded, and may not without long time be rejoined.

The power of Ambition which possesseth the mindes of men, is such, as rarely or never suffereth them to rest: The reason thereof is, That nature hath framed in them a certain disposition to desire all things, but not to obtain them; so as our desires being greater then our power, thereof followeth discontent and evil satisfaction. Hereof also proceedeth the variation of Fortune; for some men desiring to get, and others fearing to lose that they have gotten, do occasion one man to injure another, and consequently Publick Wars do follow; by means whereof, one Countrey is ruined, and an other enlarged.

Princes of great power, and cheifly those that are Inhabitants of the North, having many Children, were wont to be much inclined to the Wars, as well to win unto them-

themselves honor, as also to get possessions for their Sons; which manner of proceedings did oftentimes remove such disturbance as the plurality of Brethren bringeth. These and other reasons induced Princes to attempt War against those Kingdoms, which in their opinion seemed easily conquered, or whereunto they can pretend little; for by colour thereof they may the rather justifie their proceedings.

When a Prince deferreth to answer an Ambassador, it proceedeth from some of these respects; either because he will take time to resolve himself of somewhat whereof he doubteth, or that he intendeth covertly to deny that which is demanded, or that he esteemeth not the Prince that doth demand, or that he disdaineth the person by whom the demand is made, or else that he intendeth to hear from his own Ministers to be better resolved: Wherefore a discreet Negotiator ought in such cases to consider which of these reasons move the Prince where he is employed, to entertain him with delays, and make his dispatch accordingly.

The sufficiency of good Counsellors consisteth in four things.

First, They ought to be wise and skilful how to handle their affairs, directing all doings

doings to publick commodity.

Secondly, To be just in their proceedings, giving to every one that which to him appertaineth.

Thirdly, To be stout, and void both of partial respects and fear.

And lastly, To be temperate and moderate in their desires.

Whoso desireth to govern well and securely, it behoveth him to have a vigilant eye to the proceedings of great Princes, and to consider seriously of their designs: For it is a matter of small difficulty to live in peace with him who desireth our amity, and provideth for others that endeavor to offend us.

The intelligences that Princes study to attain, are procured by divers means: Some are brought by report, some vented by conversation and founding, some by means of espials; but the most sure and credible accurrents, are those which come from Ambassadors, chiefly those that either for the greatness of their Prince, or their own Vertue, be of most reputation. For those men conversing daily with great personages, and pondering diligently their Manners, Words, Wisdom, and the order of each mans proceedings, yea, of the Prince himself, may with commodity attain unto mat-
ters

ters of importance sooner than they that are Writers of rumors, or that take upon them to conjecture of things to come.

Whensoever a people is induced to commit so great an error, as to give reputation to one onely man, to the end he should oppress all those great men whom they hate, they thereby give him opportunity to become their Prince ; and so being assisted with their favor and aid, he may likewise extinguish all the rest of the Nobility ; and they being extirpated, he will also endeavor to tyrannize over the people, by whose help he aspired.

So many as are not consenting to the Tyranny, rest enemies to the person of the Tyrant, who can by no means gain the love of all. For impossible it is, that the riches of any Tyrant should be so great, and the Honors he can give so many as may satisfy all. Hereof it cometh, that those Tyrants that are favored of the people, and disfavor'd of the Nobles, are most secure ; because their Tyranny is supported with a greater strength (having the multitude their friends) then is the Tyrant whom the humor of the Nobles onely hath advanced.

A dangerous thing it is in all Commonwealths by continual punishing, to hold the mindes of Subjects in suspicion ; for
men

men ever fearing their ruine, will (without respect) determine to save themselves, and as men desperate, attempt innovation. All capital executions ought therefore to be executed suddenly, and as it were at one instant, so to assure the mindes of men from further molestation.

The intent of every wise Prince that maketh War, either by election or ambition, is to gain and hold what is gotten: Also to use the matter so as thereby he may enrich himself, and not impoverish his own people or Countrey.

He that enlargeth his Dominions, doth not always increase his power; but he that increaseth in force as well as in Dominion, shall thereby grow great; otherwise he gaineth no more then is shortly to be lost, and consequently he ruineth himself: For who spends more in the War, then he gains by Victory, loseth both labor and cost.

Every Prince and Commonwealth must above all things take heed, that no necessity how great soever, do perswade him to bring into his Dominion any Auxiliary Soldiers; because the hardest conditions the enemy can offer, are more easie then is such a resolution.

A Prince sheweth his ruine at hand, whensoever he beginneth to break the Laws
and

and Customs, which are antient, and have been long time obeyed by the people of his Dominion.

That Prince which careth to keep himself secure from conspiracy; ought rather to fear those to whom he hath done over-great favors, then them whom he hath much injured: For these want opportunities, the other do not; and both their desires are as one; because the Appetite of commanding, is always as much or more then the desire of revenge.

Whensoever a Prince discovers a conspiracy, he must well consider the quality thereof, measuring the force of the Conspirators with his own; and finding them many and mighty, the knowledge thereof is to be dissembled, until the Princes power be prepared to oppose them; otherwise he hazardeth his own security.

It hath been by long experience found better to send one General to an Army, though he be of mean sufficiency, then to give the same Authority to two or more excellent personages with equal Commission.

He that coveteth to be over-much loved, often times becomes contemptible; and he that endeavoreth to be over-much feared, is ever hated: And to hold the mean be-

tween them, cannot be exactly done, because nature will not so permit.

Whoso aspireth to any dignity, must resolve himself to endure the envy of men, and never to be moved for any offence conceived against him, though they that be offended, be his dear Friends: Neither shall he for the first affront or encounter, relinquish his hope; for he that constantly maketh head against the assault of Fortune, shall after with facility arrive where he designed.

In giving Council to a Prince or Commonwealth, and therewith desiring to eschue danger and offence, no other mean is to be taken then that the Counsellor shall without passion or perswasion pronounce his opinion, and never to affirm any thing as a resolution, but with modesty to defend that he speaketh; so as the Prince which follows his advice, may seem to do it voluntarily, and not forced by the importunity of him that gave the Council.

A discreet Captain being in the Field against the enemy, of whose vertue he hath had no proof, ought first by light skirmishes to feel of what vertue he is; and not to enterprize any general adventure, to the end that Terror or Fame should not daunt nor discourage his own Soldiers.

Albeit

Albeit Fraud be in all actions detested, yet is the same in Martial enterprises commendable and glorious: For that Captain who compasseth his designs by wit or stratagem is no less commended then he that vanquisheth the Enemy by violence and Force

In times of extremity, when resolution must be taken for the having or utter losse of the State, then no regard is to be had of Justice or Injustice, Mercy or Cruelty, Honor or Ignominy, but rather setting aside all respects, that course is to be follow which defended the lives and liberties of men

Whoso desireth to know what will be hereafter let him think of that is past; for the World hath ever bin in in a circular revolution: Whatsoever is now, was heretofore and things past or present are no other then such as shall be again : *redis orbis in orbem.*

A Prince that desireth to obtain any thing at the hand of another, must if it be possible urge a suddain answer, and lay before him that is moved, a necessity to resolve presently, giving him to understand that denial or delaies may breed a perilous and suddain indignation.

There is nothing more difficult, doubtful and dangerous then to attempt Innovation :

for he that taketh in hand an enterprize of such quality, maketh all those his Enemies which lived well under the old order, and findeth them cold defenders that affect his novelties, which coldness proceedeth chiefly of incredulity; for men are not easily induced to beleieve a new thing till experience hath proved it to be good.

There is no art nor other knowledg so seemly and necessary for a Prince as the Art Military with the ordinances and discipline thereof: for that is the only skill required in him that commandeth, and such a vertue as doth not only maintain them that are born Princes, but often advanceth private men to that dignity.

The deep impressions which old injuries make in the minds of great men cannot with new benefits be razed out; it is also to be remembred that injuries be done all together: For they offend the lesse, and will be forgotten the sooner; but benefits should by little and little be bestowed, so shal the memory of them long continue.

A small pleasure or displeasure presently done, doth move more then a great good turn bestowed in times past; for the taste of things present doth make a deeper impression in the minds of men, then doth the memory

mory of things past, or expectation of things to come.

It is a matter of small difficulty to sound the discontentment of other men. For every one doth willingly tell the well and ill deserving of friends, and likewise how much or how little foes can do, if we have patience to hear, which patience is the beginning of all good speed; but he that delighteth to speak much, and hear little, shall ever inform others more then he himself can learn.

Among other dangers which a Prince incurreth by being disarmed, the greatest is, that thereby he becometh contemptible; for no comparison there is between men armed and them that are disarmed: and no reason there is that he that is armed should yield obedience to him that is disarmed, neither is it like that a Prince disarmed can be secure from his own Subjects armed

A Prince ignorant of Martial knowledg, among other misfortunes cannot be esteemed or trusted of his own Soldiers; it behooveth him therefore as well in time of peace as war to exercise arms, which may be done by two meanes; the one by action of body, the other by contemplation of mind. The body may be exercised in hunting, hawking, and such like pastimes;

thereby to be made apt to endure travel : his mind likewise may be informed by reading of Histories, and the consideration of actions performed by excellent Captains, observing the occasion of their victories or losses, to the end he may imitate the one, and eschew the other.

He that doth not as other men do, but endeavoureth that which ought to be done, shall thereby rather incur peril then preservation : for whoso laboreth to be sincerely perfect and good, shall necessarily perish, living among men that are generally evil.

A Prince that useth liberality to his prejudice, ought not to regard the infamy of Miserable, because his parsimony will in time enable him to be liberal, and so may declare himself to be, having by parsimony increased his power, and therefore without imposing upon the people, may defend himself from all such as will make war ; so shall he use liberality to all them from whom he taketh nothing, who are infinite, and use miserliness to those only to whom he giveth, who are but few.

There is nothing that consumeth it self like to liberality ; for if it be long used , it taketh away the meanes to continue it, and consequently doth make men poor and basely

basely minded : or else to eschew poverty they shall be forced to extortion and become odious.

It is better to incur the name of covetous (which is a scandal without hate) then with desire to be accounted liberal, deserve the infamie of oppression (an ignominy accompanied with hatred.)

A Prince ought to be slow in believing, and advised in proceeding ; he should also beware not to make himself over much feared, but in all his actions shew great wisdom tempered with cunctation ; so shall not over much confidence induce him to be careless, nor over much diffidence render him intolerable.

Whoso observeth, shall see that men offended, less respect him whom they love, then him whom they fear. For love is maintained by a certain reciproque obligation, which because men are evil, useth to be by every occasion of profit broken. But fear is continued by a certain dread of punishment which never faileth.

A Prince that holdeth in the field an Army wherein are great numbers of Soldiers, ought not to care though he be accounted cruell: For without such an opinion conceived, he cannot keep his forces united, nor apt to attempt any enterprize.

Men for the most, do use rather to judg;
by their eyes, then by their hands, for every
one may see, but few can certainly know.
Every one seeth what thou seemest to be,
but few can understand what thou art in-
deed ; and these few dare not oppose them-
selves to the opinion of many which have
the Majesty of Estate to defend them. Also
in the actions of all men, and chiefly Prin-
ces from whom is no appellation, the end
is ever observed. *Machiave!*

A Prince being forced to use the condition
of beasts, must among them make choice
of the Fox and the Lyon ; for the Lyon can-
not take heed of snares, and the Fox is ea-
sily overcome by the Wolves, it behooveth
him therefore to be a Fox to discover the
snares, and a Lyon to terrify the
Wolves.

A Prince newly advanced cannot observe
those rules which are the cause that men be
accounted good ; he being many times con-
strained for defence of his state to proceed
contrary to promise, contrary to charity,
and all vertue ; and consequently it behoo-
veth him to have a mind apt to alteration,
as the wind and variation of fortune shall
direct ; yet ought he not to abandon the
good, if so he can, but be ready to use
what is evil if so he shall be enforced.

Every

Every Prince ought to have two ears, the one Intrinsick in respect of Subjects, the other Extrinsick in respect of forraine Potentates, from whom he may be defended with good Arms, and good Friends : Also matters Intrinsick will ever stand well so long as all things abroad rest firm.

A Prince that is favored of the multitude, need not to doubt conspiracy, but contrariwise where the people is generally discontented, and hateth the Prince, then may he reasonably doubt every thing, and every person; for no man is so poor, that wanteth a weapon wherewith to offend,

When any occasion is presented to have that thou desirest, fail not to lay hold thereof: For these worldly things do vary, and that so suddenly, as hard it is to assure ourselves of any thing, unless the same be already in hand: On the other side if any trouble threaten thee, defer it so long as thou maist; for time may occasion some accident to remove all dangers.

The Prince that doubteth the fidelity of his Subjects, must of force build Fortresses; but he that feareth forreign force more then his own people, were better to leave them unbuilt. Howsoever it be, that Prince that desireth generally to be respected and esteemed, must perform some notable enterprise

prise, and give testimony of great Vertue and Valor.

A Prince shall do well at all times to be counselled so as no man do presume to give counsel but when the Prince doth ask it. It is also to be noted, that he who is not of himself wise, cannot be well counselled of others, unless happily he yield to some wise men the Government of his whole Affairs. For good counsels from whomsoever they proceed, shall be thought to come from the Prince, and not the wisdom of the Prince to proceed from the counsel of others.

He that taketh delight to be employed in Publick Affairs, must by all means endeavor to continue in such Services : For oft one business dependeth on another, whereunto the *Florentine* Proverb may be applied, *Di cosa, nasa cosa, & il tempo governa*

Some men have not onely desired, but also compassed honor and profit; yet being in possession of both, were not therewith so satisfied as they hoped to be; which being believed, would happily extinguish the immeasurable ambition wherewith many men are possessed.

By experience I have learned that great folly it is to account that ours which we have not, or spend presently in hope of future gain. Therefore Merchants during the adventure

venture of their goods, do not increase domesticall expences but fearing the worst assure what is in hand.

For such men as have gained unto themselves reputation and are accounted vertuous, to maintain that conceipt and eschew envy, there is nothing better then a life retired from daily conversation, & chiefly of the multitude. *Fugiat sapiens commercia vulgi.*

The end that moveth a Prince to make war, is to enrich himself, and impoverish the enemy: neither is victory desired for other purpose then thereby to become the more mighty, and make the enemy weak; consequently wheresoever thy victory doth impoverish thee, or thy gain therein doth weaken thee, it followeth that either thou passe or undergoe that mark whereunto the intention of war was directed. And that Prince is by victory enriched, that can oppress the enemies power and become Master of his goods and possessions. And that Prince is by victory impoverished when the enemy notwithstanding he be victored can still maintain himself, and the spoys and possessions are not taken to the use of the Prince victorious, but imparted unto his Soldiers. For then may he be thought in his own loosing infortunate, and in victory unhappy; for if he be vanquished, then must

must he indure the offence by foes; and being victorious, shall be forced to abide the wrong offered by Friends; which as they be less reasonable, so are they also less supportable; because he is still by impositions forced to burthen the Subjects, whereof may be inferred, that the Prince having in him any generosity cannot justly rejoyce at that victory which causeth the Subjects to lament.

Who so desireth to obtain any thing, hopeth to compass his desire, either by intreaty, presents, or threatning; for so shall he to whom the request is made, be moved either with compassion, profit, or fear: Nevertheless with covetous and cruel men, and such as are in their opinion mighty, none of these can prevail. And consequently in vain do they labor, that go about by suit to stir them to pity, by gifts to gain them, or by threats to fear them.

Who so is perswaded that any Commonwealth can continue disunited, doth greatly deceive himself: True it is, that some divisions do maintain the Estate, but other do indamage the same. They which do harm, are such as with Sects and Pertakings be accompanied; they which help without Sects and Pertakings be maintained. A wise Governor therefore, albeit he cannot so exactly

exactly foresee but some enemies will arise in the State, yet may he take order that no Factions may thereby grow. It is therefore to be noted, that the Citizens of every Estate, may aspire to Reputation, either by private or publick means. Reputation by publick means, is gained chiefly in the War, either by obtaining victory in some Battel, or surprising of some City; or else by performing some Ambassage diligently, prosperously: but private Reputation is gotten by doing favor to this or that man and protecting them from Magistrates, giving them money, advancing them unworthily to Honor and Office; and by great Feasts, entertaining the multitude; of which manner of proceeding, Sects, Factions, and Partakings do grow: And as Reputation thus gained is dangerous, so the other without Faction is profitable; because the same is founded on Common welfare, and no private profit: And albeit among Citizens of this sort, will oft arise great hate, yet wanting followers for their particular profit, the State shall not be indangered, but rather strengthened; for every man endeavoring to deserve well, will hold himself within the bounds of Civil life, and by Vertuous Merits labor to be advanced.

To

To perswade or dissuade particular persons, is a matter of no difficulty: for if words suffice not, yet Authority will prevaile: but hard and perillous it is to remove a false opinion conceived by a whole multitude, for therein faire speech and no compulsion must be used.

The best means which wise Captains can use to make their Soldiers resolute, is to take from them all hope, which resolution may also be increased with the love of our Country and confidence in the Captain: for confidence groweth by the valor of men, and Discipline in former Victories, and trust reposed in the leader. The love of our Country is naturall, but the affection we bear to the Captain proceedeth rather from his vertue, then the benefits he hath bestowed. Necessity also may do much, and chiefly that where no choise is left, but either overcome by armes or dye in desperation.

There is nothing of so great force to hold an Armie united, as the reputation of the Captain, which proceedeth only from his vertue; for neither Dignity nor Authority without Valor can work that effect.

The first care that a Captain must have, is to hold his Soldiers well punished, and paid; for where payment faileth, punishment ought not to be inflicted: and consequently

quently no reason it is to punish him for robbery, whom want of pay enforceth to shift; but where the Soldier is payed, and not punished (offending) then will he without respect become insolent towards his Captain whereof insue Mutinies, Discord, and utter Ruine.

It is a custom very honorable not to promise more then thou wilt assuredly performe: yet true it is that whosoever is denied (though justly) doth rest illcontented; for men indeed are not governed by reason: otherwise it is for him that promiseth: and so good promises shall stand in stead of performance; besides that, he may find excuse enough, because the most part of men are so simple, that faire words alone have power to abuse them, cheifly when they proceed from a person of Reputation and Authority. The best way therefore is not to promise precisely, but entertain the Suitors with answers general, and full of good hope: yet not such as shall directly and absolutely bind.

The greatest and most material displeasures that use to arise between the Nobility and People, are caused by the diversity of humors, the one laboring to command, the other endeavoring not to obey; so as all troubles and disorders in every Commonweal

weale do thereof receive nutriment.

The City which is maintained rather by Factions then Lawes, so soon as one Faction is become strong and without opposition, the same of necessity must be divided in it self: for those particular causes which were at the first taken, are not of force enough to maintain it.

It is the nature of men not to indure any discommodity; unless necessity do thereunto enforce them: which may apparently be perceived by their habitations; for as the feare of Warr draweth them to places of strength (for their defence) so that perill being past, they do for the most part remove themselves to inhabit Countries of more commodity and profit.

It may seem strange, and no even measure (yet approved by experience) that where many offend few are punished. Also petty errors are severely corrected, but great and grievous crimes be rewarded. In like manner, where many receive wrong, few seek revenge. For injuries universal, are with more patience then particular offences endured.

All or the greatest part of men that have aspired to riches or power, have attained thereunto either by force or fraud: and what they have by craft or cruelty gained,

ed, to cover the foulness of their fact, they call purchase as a name more honest. Howsoever he that for want of will or wit useth not those means, must rest in servitude and poverty. The reason thereof is that as nature hath laid before men the chief of all fortunes, so she disposes them rather to Rapine then honest Industrie, and more subject to bad then good endeavors: hereof it cometh, that one man eateth an other, and he that is weakest must alwaies goe to the worst.

Where necessity forceth, boldness is reputed Wisdom, and in great enterprises perill is not to be made accompt of. For those attempts that begin with danger, alwaies end with honor, or reward; also from one perill there is no way to escape, but by entering into another.

A wise man ought not to desire to inhabit that County where men have more Authority then Lawes. For indeed that Country deserves to be desired where every one may securely enjoy his own; not that, where with facility it may be taken away; and that friends for feare to lose their own, are enforced to forsake them.

Some Magistrates either by over great zeale or ignorance take a course of Rigor, which being for the present favored, they

are ever the more imployed, as men meet to extirpate inconveniences.

Put thereby the Subjects are often drawn into desperation, and consequently have recourse unto armes, as their uttermost refuge. In this case a wise Prince for appeasing the people is forced to disallow his Ministers, and sometimes also to inflict publick punishment.

A Prince naturally suspicious, and having about him persons inclined to envie, is easily induced to mistrust those men that have served him with most sufficiency: which danger they cannot eschew, because they who are worthiest commendation are oftentimes envied by such persons as have access unto the Prince.

Who so cannot endure both envy and hate, must refrain to enterprize great matters: for great honors being desired of many, it behooveth him that aspieth unto them, to be for his dignity envied, and for his Authority hated; which Authority albeit the same be well used, yet they who hate or envie (perswading themselves it might be better handled) indeavor to oppress that power, as fearing it will be worse.

Among other things which worketh the inconveniences of Commonweales, Ambition

bition and Desperation are cheif; of both, Desperation is worst: for Ambition may attend occasion, Desperation will not, as that cannot endure delaies. Historians desiring to write the actions of men, ought to set down the simple truth, and not say any thing for love or hatred: also to chuse such an opportunity for writing as it may be lawful to think what they will, and write what they think, which is a rare happiness of the time.

In commending or disallowing the actions of men it is a course very requisite to consider the beginning, the proceeding, and end: so shall we see the reasons and causes of things, and not their bare events only; which for the most part are governed by fortune.

It is a matter of much necessity, that every man, and chiefly a Prince should in his first actions, give some testimony of Vertue: for falling at first into obloquie, doe he well or ill, all is ill taken.

The Custome of the Common people is to judge rather by their eyes then by their eares: which is the cause they allow more of external shew then inward vertue: and true it is, where excellency of mind, and beauty of body concur, the commendation due to such a person is far the greater.

Gratior est pulchro veniens è corpore virtus.

A Prince or great personage that constantly endureth adversity, deserveth great praise: yet greater commendation is due to him that beareth himself modestly in his happiness. For miseries are oft born with patience, but felicity corrupteth.

To be descended of Princes or great Personages, is a matter of meer fortune, and so to be esteemed: but adoption proceedeth from the Judgment of men; therefore seemeth incorrupt and seldom abused.

It hath been long observed, and is a rule which rarely faileth, that he shall be ever suspected of the Prince in possession, whom men account worthy to be a Prince in reversion.

It hath been a use very ancient to give credit to Astrologers, and other such persons who by their star-learning or blind divination, take upon them to tell of things to come. The reason thereof is that the most part of men beleive that soonest which they least understand; And if they see the event of a prediction though it hapneth by meer chance to fall out according to that was premised, thereupon they settle so firme an impression, as albeit many other faile, yet the good concept of their cunning cannot be removed.

Liberality

Liberality is a vertue which gaineth love, but much are they deceived whom riot in lies thereof abuseth. To cast away and consume is soon learned, but to give in good order few have the skill.

In time of suddain mutiny, conspiracy, and offence of people, the wisest resolution is not to oppose force to prevent fury, but rather give space for the bad to amend, and the good to consent: for treasons prevaile on the sudden, but good Council gathers forces by leasure.

Mature deliberation ought ever to be used, but when armes are to determine, speedy execution is the best: because no delay in that enterprise is fit which cannot be commended before it be ended.

Who so is pleased to observe the proceedings of men in Authority, shall observe that some of them hold a plain course without respect: others projecting for time to come do forecast how to hold their present good fortune or at least to escape danger: for they mistrusting present prosperity and fearing a change, prepare beforehand some private friends to oppose against publick hatred: whereof may be inferred, that no care is taken of innocency, but every one studieth how to pass without punishment.

In Captains and all Military Commanders, three things are required, Vertue, Discipline, and Authority; but in private Soldiers obedience and courage only sufficeth; for by due obeying, and no curious scanning the leaders directions are maintained; and the Army in danger is alwaies most valiant, which before the danger is most quiet. Let the Soldier therefore be well armed and valiantly minded. To advise and direct must be the Captains care

It is a matter of no great moment, yet alwaies worthy the noting, that any exterior behavior, or garment presenting pride or greatness, chiefly in persons lately advanced, though no man be thereby interested or injured, doth move in others a certain offence: for the nature of man is such, as beholdeth the new prosperity of others with an envious eye, and wisheth a moderation of fortune nowhere so much as in those we have known in equall degree with our selves

In all enterprises of Warr, (if present necessity doth not otherwise require) leisure and deliberation ought to be used; for often it sufficeth in lieu of Wisdom, to take the advantage of other mens folly.

All men that are to consider of great actions, ought to be informed whether that
which

which is undertaken be profitable for the Commonweale, honorable to themselves, and easy to be effected : or at least not greatly difficult. Also he that perswadeth, is to be examined whether besides bare words and Counsel, he will joyn his own perill ; and if fortune favour the attempt, to whom the principal glory shall redound.

The perils which accompanie private enterprises, are far unlike to those which he doth enter that aspieth to principality. For in private attempts a man may pause or proceed as he will ; But to him that aspires to Empire there remains no middle course, but either by Victory to triumph as a Prince ; or being vanquished to endure death as a Traytor .

Let no man in his prosperity, give much credit to common applause or service assured by any of whom in meaner fortune he hath had no experience : for the base people are learned in no lesson, only without difference of truth or falsehood to flatter men in Authority, and with shouts and words of great rejoycing make shew of great affection.

As overmuch haste is dangerous, so too great delay oftentimes proveth disadvantageous : for albeit consultation ought to

foregoe action, yet to dispute long and in the end reject the advice of either side, or take a middle course (which in cases of doubt and danger is worst) was ever accounted great discretion.

There is no course more comely, nor any resolution so well befitting a wise man, having made proof of his own vertue (and finding in age no fortune due to such effect) as to retire himself from the Court and company; for so shall he shun the inconveniences of contempt and the discommodity of travell (*Jucunda senectuti otia*) yet true it is that who so hath lived a Prince or governed as a publick person, cannot expect security in a private estate.

Whensoever danger draweth near, and terror is at hand, all men look about, but none willingly adventure: For in such cases every man will give Council, but few will take part of the peril.

In Commonwealths where Sects or Partialities be, the Leader of any side is able to kindle Civil War; yet is he unable to moderate the Victory: For to stir up dissensions and troubles, the worst man most commonly bears the stroke; but peace and quietness are not established but by men of rare gifts and excellent vertue.

It may seem strange and contrary both to
courtesie

courtesie and Christian profession, that men are far more mindful of injuries done unto them, then of benefits received by them. The reason thereof is, that Thankfulness is accompted a burden, but Revenge is sweet, and reckoned a great gain.

Of reconciled foes, and such as know that our harms were caused by their means, we oft-times expect favor, as perswaded that new friendship will repair the loss of old displeasure: But the matter doth seldom so fall out; for the quality of mans nature is ever to hate those whom he hath hurt, and love them whom he hath made behold-ing. *Quos laeserunt oderunt. Tac.*

To common persons and such as are ignorant in matters of State, every Taxation and Imposition seemeth heavy or superfluous; yet the wiser sort know, that the end of all publick endeavor is to confirm people in Peace, and Peace cannot be maintained without arms; nor Arms without Pay, nor Pay without Impositions.

As fortunate folk are envied, so are the poor contemned; which rule reacheth also to Princes: The one lives in Plenty with War, the other in Poverty with Peace. For seldom is it seen, that those people are assaulted where nothing is to be gained, and whose base Beings afford no other spoils then blood and beggery. Wise-

Wisemen have observed that in matter of State, and the managing thereof, three things are especially to be looked unto: The first is, *Occasion*; the second, the Intentions of other Men; the third, our own Affection. For there is nothing that slippeth away so soon as *Occasion*; nothing so difficult as to judge what an other man intendeth; nor any thing more nocent then our own immoderate desires.

It hath been ever a course observed by wise Princes, but much more by *Aristocracies* and *Popular States*, against Force and Fury of the multitude, to defend themselves with Silver and Gold.

How much more it importeth all Princes to lead a vertuous life, and give daily example of Piety and Justice, appears apparantly in the proceedings of the *Roman* Bishops; who by the well-doing of some few of them at the first, became greatly honored; but afterwards they became contemptible: For the Reverence which men did bear to the sanctity of their lives failing, it was impossible of so contrary Manners and Examples to look for like effects.

The success of the War cheifly dependeth on the Reputation of the Prince, which declining, the vertue also of the Soldiers faileth: Likewise the fidelity of the people decayeth,

decayeth, and their money to maintain the War, ceaseth ; contrariwise, the courage of the enemy is increased, they that stood doubtful become resolved, and every difficulty augmenteth.

The Authority which Princes give, is chiefly in respect of Wisdom and Valor: Yet true it is, that for the most part, they accompt them the wisest men that can best accommodate themselves to their humor.

The greatest distress and difficulty which can come to any Army, doth proceed of these causes: Want of money, scarcity of victuals, hatred of people, discord of Captains, disobedience of Soldiers, and their flying to the enemy, either of necessity or freewil.

A Prince or great Magistrate having long maintained the reputation of Wisdom and Vertue, must take heed that no rash or dangerous resolution do taint the Honorable Fame of his former life: For to be transported with anger against his own profit, is lightness; and to esteem small dangers more then great, is want of judgment.

A Prince or Person of great estate, must be wary not to inure the conceit of double-dealing: For little sincerity and trust is looked in his actions, of whom there is an opinion of craft and falshood conceived.

Experience

Experience hath always proved, that whatsoever the most part of men desire, rarely cometh to pass: The reason hereof is, that the effects of Humane actions commonly depend on the will of a few; and their intentions ever differing from the greater number. the end and success cannot be other then as pleaseth the few that are to direct them.

There is nothing more dangerous then to enterprize a War, or other actions of importance upon popular perswasion; for such expectations are vain, and such designs fallible: Also the Fury of the multitude is great, when danger is little or far off; but perils growing great and near, their courageth quaileth as they whose Passions have no rule or measure.

It is strange to see how apt men are to doubt displeasure threatned by enemies, cheifly when they draw near; for the people do naturally over-much fear dangers at hand, and esteem less then is fit of things present: Also to make small accompt of those that are far from them, because divers remedies may be hoped as well by time, as other accidents.

The offensive words or answers of indignation, proceeding from great Princes, ought never to admit displeasure into the mindes

mindes of them against whom they are spoken: For having by Speech uttered a great part of Choler, the edge of their Deeds becomes the calmer, and more easily appeased: Such is the condition of noble and generous Spirits.

To judge right of other mens merit, seems of great difficulty; for time and tryal is thereto required; also it is not easie to answer the expectation of men, but oft-times inconsiderate, and not measured in due proportion.

It is a part of great discretion to divide the seasons of Affairs and Vacations: For as it fitteth well a Prince or Person of Dignity in times of Audience and Judgment, to be grave, heedful, and austere: So those Offices performed, all shew of authority and sad looks ought to be set apart; for by that means, neither courteous behavior shall detract from the Reverence due to his place, nor severity diminish the love which to his Behavior appertaineth.

Magistrates must look into all things, but not exact all things to rigor. Light faults may be pardoned, but great offences severely corrected; yet not always proceeding to punishing, but oft contented with repentance. To be bitter in rebuking is also fit for a Magistrate, shewing himself sowe to the bad,

bad, and sweet to the good ; framing both Countenance and Condition according to the merit of men ; and be perswaded that it is more honest to offend, then to hate.

Soldiers must be encouraged in all Fortunes to stand resolved, and not to be danted with any passed misadventure ; ever attending a time and opportunity of revenge ; which commonly cometh to pass where mens mindes are united : For common danger must be repelled with union and concord.

Among other reasons wherewith Soldiers are encouraged, Necessity and Distress doth oft inforce them : For as men of vertue perform the actions of Arms for Honor, so the coward must do them for his security.

All Enterprises attempted by Arms, are honorable ; but those that are done in Countreys remote, are more praisable : For the less they be in knowledge, the greater is the glory to atchieve them.

To be truly and faithfully loved, is a thing greatly to be desired ; for Terror and Fear are weak works of Affection : For they being taken away, he that ceaseth to fear, will soon begin to hate ; and as they that by force are kept under, obey with ill will ; so they that govern without Line justly, rule against Right.

Some men either deserving to be accomplished

ed of excellent wisdom, or singular in that skill whereof they make profession, do ordinarily love the proceedings of others, taking that advantage of their ill success; yet sure it is, that Disaster and unhappy Event of some Actions, proceed not of disorder, nor Humane imperfection, but from a certain fatal Fury, which neither Council nor Constancy of Men can withstand.

It is a matter of much difficulty, or rather impossible for any Prince to maintain the Law, Civil or Military without severity: For where men hope to be easily pardoned, there are they apt to offend. Contrarily where mens actions are precisely fitted, there do they live in over great awe, and Hatred doth always accompany such Severity. The best course therefore is to punish offences severely, and reward vertuous Merits liberally; so shall Fear be converted to reverend respect, and none have cause to complain: For as it lies in each mans power to shun offending, so is it in their power also to deserve well, and merit reward.

Whosoever after mature deliberation, hath resolved what course to hold in the Action he hath in hand, must not after repent or fear any difficulty: For such thoughts would break the vigor of the Minde, and impeach the proceedings of that which was resolved.

resolved. And albeit some differences do happily arise, yet must he believe that every other course would have been accompanied with the same or greater impediments.

Yong men for the warmness of their Blood, and for not having before-time been deceived by Fortune, more willingly enterprise Actions rather honorable then severe. But old men as well for that their heat is cooled, as also for having attempted many things in vain, make choice of Enterprises severe rather then those that are followed with Fame and Glory.

The greatness of one Prince is nothing else but the ruine and distress of another : Likewise his strength is the weakness and oppression of others.

Some Conquests are of such quality, as albeit a victorious Captain merit triumphal Honor; yet a modest refusal becomes his greater glory.

The Dignity of Magistrates is not assured without Arms ; for when Obedience faileth, no other means is left to continue a people united.

As willing Obedience in Subjects is the Princes strength, so is the same their own security : For as by the Princes Authority the people are governed, so by their consent he is maintained.

Three things men covet with immoderate desire, Lands, Riches, and Honors; but as seldom they compass their full content, so are they for the most part to endure a destiny far other then they wished.

Strange it is, yet by experience proved true, that in time of danger, Fortune or (rather Destiny) so much amazeth the judgment of wise men, as seldom they conceive what resolution is best to be taken.

No great Free-City can long continue quiet, unless the same be used to foreign assaults: For wanting foes without, some inward enmity will arise; not unlike to strange bodies of men; which being secure from external injury, are nevertheless by their own poise oppressed.

As every Pilot of ordinary skill knoweth in calm and quiet Seas to direct the course of his Ship; so every Governor of capacity doth understand how the affairs of State are in peaceable times to be handled: But when Tempests are, and Subjects bent to Sedition; the one requires an excellent Sailer, the other the aid of some excellent Wisdom.

It oft happens, that publick Duty is opposite to private Friendship; so as we are either forced to omit the Offices due to our Countrey, or draw our dearest friends into danger: In which case we are to prefer
L publick

publick respect, before particular Obligation.

The nature of base people is such, as either they obey slavishly, or command insolently: For liberty being the mark whereat they aim, is by them of that quality, neither moderately desired, nor discreetly continued; and always there are some seditious Leaders to be found, who of disorder are inclined to kindle the ire and offence of ignorant people. *Dux rebus motis, facile invenitur. Salust.*

Experience hath oft proved, that Men in best Fortune, and such as esteem themselves most secure, even then fall soonest into disadvantage, because those dangers unfeared be as it were contemned, and not regarded.

To enter needless dangers, was ever accounted Madness, yet in times of extream peril and apparent distress, bold and hazardous attempts are greatest security.

The divers Adventures which happen to men, may well inform that much better it is, chiefly in Arms, to be governed by Reason then by Fortune.

A certain Peace is ever accounted better security then Victory hoped or expected. *Melior intiorque certa pax quam sperata victoria. Livi.*

If to our Prosperity God were pleased to add the Grace of Wisdom, we should thereby judge not onely of what is past, but also of all that can succeed hereafter.

Rarely or never can we consider truly of worldly proceedings, unless first we have felt the deceits of Fortune. Discord or Dissention in any State or City, offers opportunity to such men as are ambitious to work their will : For the humor of Sects and Partialities is such as the weaker Faction doth ever chuse rather to call for aid of strangers, then yield to the Dominion of an adverse party.

Ancient Customs may not violently and suddenly be taken away. Fortune which altereth all things, will by little and little wear them out of use.

To be oft in fight, and converse much with men, breedeth a kinde of Satiety : therefore it behoveth persons of great estate and Authority to be retired, lest over-much familiarity should detract from the reverence due to honorable Estate.

The natures of men not content to live according to their Fortune and Birth, are of all others most prone to Envy ; because they hate the vertue and welfare of all such as are in estimation above them.

Great heed is to be taken, that no Citizen

or Subject, be suffered to aspire to such greatness, as cannot be forced to obey the Laws; and no order there is of more necessity, then that every man of what quality soever, may be without respect accused and judged.

For conservation of particular Greatness and Dignity, there is nothing more noble and glorious, then to have felt the force of every Fortune.

It is the quality of wise men onely, to know how to use Prosperity, and never to trust too much to the favors of present Happiness. A man well advised in his Prosperity, beareth not himself towards others either proud or violent; nor must he believe in his own present felicity, for the Day knows not what the Night bringeth: He onely is to be reputed a man, whose minde cannot be puffed up by prosperity, nor dejected by any adverse Fortune.

Men of Cholerick humor are easily moved with insolent Speeches, but wise men laugh them to scorn.

The way whereby a Prince eschues the hate of Subjects, is, not to take from them their Lands or Goods; yet albeit the blood of some few be tainted, unless the same be accompanied with Confiscation (which a Prince is rarely forced to use) it seldom causeth him to become odious. A

A Rule most certain it is, that he who commands any thing unpleasing, must by severe means cause it to be observed; and who desireth to be obeyed, must know how to command: And he onely knows how to command, that doth compare his own force with those that are to obey; wherein finding a proportion, then he may boldly proceed, otherwise forbear.

In Actions of difficulty great courage is to be used, and who so compasseth any thing by violence, cannot maintain it by mildness, nor command by affability: He therefore that is of nature soft, should do best to refrain all extraordinary commands, and in matters ordinary imploy the vertue of his milde spirit; because ordinary punishments are not imputed to the Prince or his Magistrates, but to the Laws and Ordinances of State.

When Necessity presseth, desperation is deemed Wisdom, and generous mindes do not accompt of danger, because those attempts which begin with peril, do for the most part end with glory.

He that endeavors to be good among many that are evil, or will uphold that which those labor to pull down, of Force worketh his own undoing. All Commonwealths alter from order to disorder, from

disorder to order again ; for Nature having made all worldly things variable, so soon as they have attained their utmost perfection and height, they must descend ; so from good they fall back to evil, and from evil they return to good. War begets quiet, quiet idleness, idleness disorder, disorder ruine, likewise ruine order, order vertue, vertue glory and good fortune,

Wise men have observed, that Arms were before Learning, and Captains before Philosophers ; for good and well regulated Armies having gained victory, established rest and security, whereof the Study of Letters and Liberal Sciences ensued.

That Country deserveth to be loved of all men, which loves all men indifferently, and not that Countrey which respecting the best part, advanceth a few : No man therefore is to be blamed, if for such cause he desire rather to abandon then embrace his Country.

Commonwealths are Bodies mixt, yet have they of Bodies simple some resemblance : And as in these, many infirmities grow, which without violent Medicines cannot be cured ; so in the other many mischiefs arise, which a good and godly Patient should offend to leave uncured, though therein he use both force and fire.

Those

Those Wars be most just which are most necessary ; and those Arms are most merciful where no hope of help remains but in them onely.

In Actions which promise either publick glory, or private honor, men may be reasonably perswaded to adventure life and living, because great hope there is to die with Reputation, or live to recover that Peace which War hath consumed : But where men are no less oppressed by insolvency of Commanders, then by insolvency of Foes, there is the calamity doubled, and of two evils the danger of War seemeth least ; for that hath end, the other is infinite.

Who so perswades himself to be no less esteemed in evil then good Fortune, is deceived : For promises made, during distress, are rarely performed, unless the same necessity continue.

The intent of every Prince, or other State that makes War, is to enrich himself, and impoverish the enemy : Neither is Victory for other occasions sought, nor the possessions of the enemy to other end desir'd, then to make themselves mighty, and their enemy weak. It follows then, that so oft as the victory impoverishes them, or the gains weaken them, either they pass or come short of that mark whereat the War was aimed.

Ancient and wel-governed Commonwealths were wont by their Conquests to fill the Treasuries with Gold and Silver, to give reward to Soldiers, to spare the people from Tributes, to make Triumphs and Publick Feasts : But in later times the Wars have used, first, to consume the Treasure, and after impoverish the people without assuring them from their enemies.

A Prince or State that leaves promises unperformed, by reason of unexpected impediments, and for no ill intent, ought not to be blamed : Neither are such accidents any just cause or colour why friends should abandon their confederates.

Where Magistrates govern justly, Subjects obey dutifully ; where private persons grow rich, and Princes enlarge their Empire ; there is the Commonwealth blessed, and the people fortunate.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVI.

Maximes of State , or Prudential grounds and Polemical Precepts , concerning all Estates, and forms of Policie in times of Peace or War, &c. confirmed by select Narations, and Historical Parallels.

ALL Cities and Towns of State are builded either by people dwelling in or about the place where they are builded, or else they are made by strangers: Of the first are *Athens* and *Venice*, of the other *Alexandria* and *Florence*.

The fortune of every City builded, and vertue of the builder, appeareth by choice of the place, and quality of Laws: for as fertile places occasion men to be slothfull, unless by good laws they be forced to labor, so barrenness compells them to industry; which reason induceth wise men to plant habitations in either: Examples of the first are *Ferrara* and *Rome*, of the second *Ragusa* and *Genoa*.

All Laws whereby Commonwealths are governed were either made by some one excellent

cellent man, and at an instant ; or else they were ordained at sundry times according to such accidents as besel. Example the laws of *Sparta* made at the beginning *Lycurgus*, the laws of *Rome* at sundry times.

The government of every City in time becomes corrupt ; Principality changeth into Tyranny : the Optimacy is made the government of the people ; and the Popular estate turns to licentious disorder ; which instability or alteration moved some Law-makers to take order that in the government of their City there should be a mixture of all three, and was the cause that the policy of *Sparta* continued 800 years, when the popular State of *Athens* endured not one hundred. Example, the laws of *Sparta* made by *Lycurgus*, and the Laws of *Athens* by *Solon*.

Who so taketh in hand to frame any State or government, ought to presuppose that all men are evil, and at occasions will shew themselves so to be. Example, the envy of the people of *Rome* to the Nobles, and their Insolency towards them appeared not so long as the Kings governd ; but the *Tarquins* being banished, opportunity was thereby offered that the malice of the one and the other became discovered.

The divers honors of the Nobility and people

people, the one desiring to command, the other not to obey, are the cause of continual troubles, unless some third mean there be of more authority then either, to bridle the force of both. Example, The Kings in *Rome* expelled, forthwith arose much mutiny, and could not be suppressed till the *Tribum Plebis* were created; whose authority wrought the same effect which the Kings had done.

Some States endeavor to enlarge their dominions, and some others labour only to maintain that estate they antiently possessed. Example of the first was the City of *Rome*, of the second *Sparta*.

All States desiring to live at liberty, think fit that every man should be permitted to accuse any Citizen that offendeth, which manner of proceeding works two excellent effects: First that the people should not dare for fear of accusing to attempt ought against the State; or if they do, they shall be presently and without respect punished. Secondly by liberty of accusing, every man hath means to utter the offence wherewith he can charge others, which he could not, unless it were lawfull to take such an ordinary course, and consequently be driven to ways extraordinary, particular revenge, or calling in forreign forces. Example, *Coriolanus*
and

and *Appius, Claudius* at Rome, *Lucannone* at *Chinfi*, *Francisco Valeri* in *Florence*.

As accusations are in every State necessary, so slanders are dangerous, and worthy of punishment; the difference betwixt accusations and slanders, is, that the one is publickly performed before Magistrates, with good proofs and Witnesses to maintain the truth of the accusation; but slanders are as well publickly performed as dispersed in secret and places of repair without Witness and Justification, so as every man may be slandered, but few are orderly accused. Example, *Appius Claudius* accused by *L. Virginus*; *Furius Camillus*, slandered by *Manlius Capitolinus*.

The only meanes to suppress Slander is, to give authority to some persons of repute to compel every slanderer to become an accuser; and if the accusation prove true, then to reward the accuser, or at least not to punish him. Example *Manlius* the slanderer of *Camillus* for his untrue information punished.

A rule most certain and assured it is, that every Kingdom and State at the first well framed, or after well informed, doth take the perfection thereof from the wisdom of some excellent man, who ought not to be blind though in a matter of great moment
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he happily useth some extraordinary violence or proceedings; for he that employeth force to mend and not to mar, deserves commendation. Example, *Romulus*, *Lycurgus*, *Cleomenes*.

There lives no man so simple or wise, so wicked or well disposed, but prefers those persons that are praisable, before those that are blamable: notwithstanding for that well near all men are beguiled in discerning what indeed is good, deeming that honorable which in truth is otherwise; they suffer themselves either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a course which meritts rather infamy then commendation. Example, every man wisheth himself *Timoleon* or *Agésilas*, rather then *Dionysius* or *Phalaris*; rather a *Titus* or *Trajan*, then *Caligula* or *Vitellius*.

Who reads Histories treating of great Actions shall perceive that good Princes indeed are more secure and better defended by the love of the People, and Fidelity of Counsellors, then were they that entertained many Legions and Men of War. Example, of all those Emperors which raigned after *Cæsar* untill *Maximinus* the greatest number were for their vices taken and slain, only *Galba* and *Pertinax* excepted who were good Emperors.

A Prince of great knowledge both in Armes and Wisdom so firmly setteth the foundation of Government, as albeit his successor be of the less vertue, yet may he be maintained even by the memory of his predecessor : but if it happen that the third Prince prove not more like the first then the second, then all that is past goeth to ruine. Example, The Martial Valor of *Romulus* was the cause that *Numa* might governe safely in peace : which *Tullus* could not have done, had he bin unlike to *Romulus* ; nor should *Bajazet* Emperor of *Turky* have enjoyed the state of his Father *Mahomet* and left the same to his posterity, if *Selim* his son had not been more like to his Grandfather then to *Bajazet* his Father.

The succession of two excellent Princes, cheifly if they be of long life, works wondrous effects : the like is seen in Optimacies or Popular States, where the Governors successively elected be men of great vertue and understanding. Example, The first appeared in *Philip* of *Macedon*, and *Alexander* his Son, the second in the Consuls of *Rome*.

In every State where Soldiers are not, the fault thereof proceeds from the Governors. Wise Princes were therefore wont even in times of Peace to cause warlike exercises

ercises to be used; for without them the most warlick nations become not only ignorant in Martial knowledge, but also effeminate. Example, *Pelopidas & Epaminondas* in *Thebes*, and King *Tullus* in *Rome* as well in peaceable as troublesome times used exercise of Armes

No Prince or State well advised, hazards his whole estate upon the valor of some few persons, nor ought to strength of straight places where the Enemy is to pass. Example, *Tully* King of *Rome*, & *Metius* King of *Alba*, condiscended that three of their Nobility for either side chosen should enter Combate, and that Nation which were victorious should command the other. *Francis* the French King going to recover *Lombardy*, was by the *Switzers* attended into two or three places in the Mountains, hoping there to repulse him, but the King taking another way, passed securely and prevaild.

Every State well governed doth reward men of good merit, and punish all offenders; and if any person of good desert shall wilfully be a delinquent, the same man ought notwithstanding his former service, be punished. Example, The same *Horatio* that in Combat gained the victory against the *Albani*, having insolently slain his own sister,

sister, was notwithstanding his egregious Act and the fresh memory thereof, called into triall of his life, and with great difficulty obtained pardon: and *Manlius* who had with great glory saved the Capitol, for moving sedition in *Rome*, was after from the same cast down headlong.

Every wise man having performed any great service to his Prince or Country, ought to be content with such recompence as it shall please the Prince or Country to bestow: measuring the same according to the Power of the giver, and not the merit of him that receiveth. Example, *Horatius Cocles* for having lost his hand in defence of the bridge of *Rome*, and *Mutius Scavola* suffering his hand to be burnt for his attempt to kill King *Porfenna*, were rewarded with a small portion of Land; and *Manlius* that defended the Capitol from the *Galleyes*, had no greater reward then a little measure of meale.

Ingratitnde is a vice so natural and Common, as not only private persons, but Princes and States also either through covetousnes or suspicion are therewith infected. Example, *Vespasian* proclaimed Emperor, was chiefly aided by *Antonius Primus*, and by his helpe prevailed against *Vitellius*, in reward of which service *Vespasian* removed

removed him from the command of his Army and gave that honor to *Mutianus*. *Consalvo Ferranoe* having taken the Kingdom of *Naples* from the *French*, was first remov'd from his Command of the Castles and Soldiers, and in the end brought into *Spain* where in disgrace he ended his life *Collatinus Tarquinius* who with the aide of *Brutus* suppressed the *Tarquins* of *Rome*, and with him *Pub. Valerius* were banisht for no other cause but for being of the name of *Tarquin*, theother because he built a house upon mount *Cælio*.

All Errors that great Captains commit, are either wilfull or ignorant, towards the one and the other of which offenders to use greater lenity then the quality of their offences deserves, seemeth necessary: for men of honor suffer nought by the infamy which evill service doth bring. It is also to be considered that a great Captain being cumbered with many cares, cannot proceed in his actions couragiously if he stand in daily doubt to be punisht for every error that hapneth. Example, *Sergius* and *Virginus* were before *Vesio*, the one part of the Army on the one side of the City, the other not far from the place. *Sergius* being assaulted by the *Falisci* was not aided by *Virginus*, neither would he require his help, such

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was the envy the one bare to the other ; and consequently their offence is wilful and worthy of capital punishment. Likewise when *Varro* by his ignorance, received an overthrow by *Hannibal* at *Canna*, he was nevertheless pardoned and honorably welcomed home by the whole Senate.

Whensoever an inconvenience ariseth within or without the State, it seems a resolution more sure to dissemble the knowing thereof, then to seek by sudden violence to suppress it. Example, *Cosmo de Medicos* having gained extraordinary reputation in *Flourence*, the Citizens imagined, that to suffer the same to increase, was dangerous, and therefore they banished him : Which extream proceeding, so offended the friends of *Cosmo*, being the stronger, as they forced the Citizens to revoke him, and make him Prince of that City. The like hapned in *Rome*, where *Caesar* for his vertue, much admired and followed, became afterwards to be feared ; and they that feared, not considering their force to be inferior to the power of *Caesar*, endeavoring to oppress him, were the occasion of his greater glory.

In every Republick, an excessive Authority given to one or two persons for long time, proveth dangerous, chiefly when the
same

same is not restrained. Example, The Dictatorship given to *Caesar* for life, was an occasion to oppress the Liberties of the *Romans*. The same effect was before that time like to follow the *Decemvirate*, by suffering *Appius Claudius* to prolong the time of his Dignity.

The Ambition of Men is such, as rarely they will obey when formerly they have commanded; neither do they willingly accept of mean Office, having before late in higher place: Yet the Citizens of well-governed States, did not refuse as well to obey as command. Example, The victory the *Romans* obtained against the *Veienti*, *Q. Fabius* was slain, having the year before been Consul: Nevertheless he then served in meaner place under *C. Manilius*, and *M. Fabius* his own Brother then Consul.

There is nothing more strange, yet by experience proved true, That men in adverse Fortune be much grieved, and in prosperity also discontented; which is the reason, that not being forced to fight for necessity, they will nevertheless contend for Ambition; and that humor doth as well possess those that live aloft, as others whom Fortune holdeth down. Example, The people of *Rome* having by the Authority of the *Tri-*

bunes obtained to make themselves secure from oppression of the Nobility, forthwith required, That the Honor and Office of State might be also imparted unto them. The like Ambition moved them to have their part of Lands by force of *Lex Agraria*, which was at last the overthrow of the *Roman* liberty.

It seemeth that people displeased with some Innovations hapned in the State, do sometime without just Reasons complain of those that govern: Not unlike to a sick man who deemeth that the Physician, not the Fever, is the cause of his grief. Example, The people of *Rome* were perswaded that the Ambition of Consuls was the cause of continual War, therefore required that no more Consuls should be; yet were they content that certain *Tribunes* should command with like Authority, so was nothing altered in the Government but the Governors title, which alone did content them.

Nothing can corrupt and alter the nature of man so much, or so soon as the immoderate desire of Honor; in so much as men of honest mindes and vertuous inclinations are sometimes by Ambition, drawn to abuse that goodness whereunto they are inclined. Example, *Appianus Claudius* having lived long an enemy to the Multitude, hoping by
their

their aid to continue his Authority of the *Decemviri* in Rome, became their Friend, and disfavoured the factions of great men. Likewise *Q. Fabius* a man of singular virtue, being also called to that dignity by *Appius* self, adulterated his nature and became like unto him.

Seldom or never is any people discontented without just cause; yet if happily they be asked whereof their offence proceedeth, many times for want of some fit man to pronounce their grief, they stand silent. Example, The *Romans* at the death of *Virginia*, were gathered together armed upon Mount *Sacro*, and being asked by the Senate, for what cause they so did? no answer was made, until *Virginio* Father of the Virgin had procured, that twenty of the Tribunes might be made to be as head of the people, and confer with the Senate.

A great Folly or rather meer Madness it seemeth to desire any thing, and tell beforehand that the end and purpose of the desire is evil; for thereby he sheweth reason why it ought not to be granted. Example, The *Romans* required of the Senate that *Appius* and the rest of the *Decemviri* should be delivered into their hands, being determined to burn them all alive.

The first part of their request seemed

reasonable, but the end thereof unreasonable.

A course very dangerous it is in all States, by continual accusing and punishing, to hold the Subject in doubt and daily fear: For he that stands always looking for some trouble, becometh careless and apt to attempt innovation. Example, The *Decemviri* being oppressed, the Tribunes authorised in their place, endeavored daily to call in question the most part of the *Decemviri*, and many other Citizens also, whereof great inconveniences arose, and much danger would have ensued, had not a Decree propounded by *M. Duilius* been made, that for one year no *Roman* Citizen should be accused.

Strange it is to see how men in seeking their own security, lay the injuries which they fear upon other men; as though it were necessary, either to offend or be offended. Example, The *Romans* among themselves, united and strong, always endeavored to offend the Nobles; and the Nobles likewise being perswaded they were strong, labored to oppress the people: Which humors were the cause of continual troubles.

To make estimation and choice of men fit to govern, the best course is to consider
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in particular ; otherwise it might be imagined, that among the Multitude or meaner people , they being the greatest number, might be found some persons of more perfection. Example, The people of *Rome* desiring that the Consulship might be given among them as men of most merit, did by all means endeavor to obtain that honor ; but being come to election, and every mans vertue particularly considered, there could not be among the Multitude onely one found fit for so great a place ; and therefore the people themselves consented , that the dignity should still remain as it was.

To perswade a Multitude to any enterprise, is easie, if that which is perswaded, doth promise either profit or honor ; yet oft under that external appareance lies hid loss or disadvantage. Example, The *Romans* perswading themselves that the slow proceeding of *Fabius Maximus* in the War, was both chargable and cowardly, required, That the General of the Horse might direct the War ; which course had ruined *Rome*, if the wisdom of *Fabius* had not been. Likewise when *Hannibal* had divers years raigned in *Italy*, one *M. Centenius Penula*, a man of base birth, yet a Soldier of some repute, undertook that if he with such Vo-

luntiers as would follow him, might have authority to fight, he would within few days deliver *Hannibal* either alive or dead: Which offer was by the Senate accounted rash, yet for fear to offend the people, granted; and *Pennla* with his Soldiers was cut in pieces.

To appease a Mutiny or Tumult in any Camp or City, there is no means more speedy or successful, then if some person of great quality and respect, present himself to the people, and by his wisdom lay before them the damage of their Discords, perswading them to Peace and Patience. Example, The faction of the *Frateschi* and *Arvatiani* in *Florence*; the one ready to assault the other. *Francisco Soderini* Bishop of *Viterro* in his Episcopal Habit, went between the parties and appeased them: Also Count *Egremont* by the Authority of his wisdom and presence, suppressed a great mutiny in *Antwerp*, between the Martinists and Papists.

A people corrupted, do rarely or never observe any Order or Ordinance, unless by force of some Princes power they be there to inforced; but where the Multitude is incorrupt and religious, all things are done justly, and without compulsion. Example, *Camillus* at the victory against the *Urenti*,
vowed

vowed that the tenth part of the pillage should be offered to *Apollo*; but the Senate supposing that the people would not consent to so great a Contribution, studied to dispence with that vow, and to please *Apollo* and the people also by some other means: Whereat the people shewed themselves openly offended, and willingly gave no less then the sum formerly decreed. When the Free-Cities of *Germany* are occasioned to make money for any Publick Service, the Magistrates impose One or two in the hundred on every City, which done, everyone is sworn to lay down so much as in his own Conscience he is able; and he with his own hand, no other witness being present, casteth the money into a Coffer prepared for the purpose; which he would not, if his own Conscience did not inforce him.

When any extraordinary occasion happens to a City or Province, some prodigious voice is heard, or some marvellous sights are seen. Before *T. Gracchus* General of the *Roman* Army was betraid by *Flavius Lucanus*, the *Aruspices* discovered two Serpents eating the Entrails of the Beasts sacrificed; which done, they vanished: which vision as they divined, prognosticated the Generals death: Likewise *F. Savanarola* foretold the coming of King *Charls* the

the Eight into *Italy* : And *M. Seditius* when the *Galls* first came towards *Rome*, informed the Senate he heard a voice much louder then any mans, crying aloud, *Galli veniunt.*

The multitude of base people is naturally audacious and apt to innovation ; yet unless they be directed by some persons of Reputation and Wisdom, rarely do they joyn in any action of great import. Example, The *Romans* when their City was taken and sackt by the *Galls*, went to *Veio* with determination to dwell there : The Senate informed thereof, commanded that upon great pain, every Citizen should return to *Rome*, whereat the people at first mocked ; but when every man particularly within himself considered his own peril, all in general determined to obey the Magistrates.

In the employment of Men for Service, neither Age nor Fortune ought so much to be regarded as Vertue ; for yong men having made tryal of their valor, soon become aged, and thereby either unapt or unable to serve : Therefore well-governed Commonwealths, preferred Military Vertue before any other respect. Example, *Valerius Corvinus* with others made Consul the Three and twentieth year of his age,
and

and *Pompey* triumphed in his youth.

No wise or well advised Prince or other State will undertake without excessive Forces to invade the Dominions of any other Prince, unless he assure himself of some Friends there to be a Mean, and as it were a Gate to prepare his passage. Example, The *Romans* by aid of the *Saguntines* entered *Spain*, the *Ætoli* called them into *Greece*, the *Hedais* into *France*: Likewise the *Palæologi* incited the *Turk* to come into *Thrace*; and *Ludovicus Sforza* occasioned *Charls* the French King to come into *Italy*.

A Republick desirous to extend the bounds thereof, must endeavor to be fully furnished with Inhabitants, which may be done both by Love and Force: Love is gained by suffering strangers to inhabit the City securely; and Force compels people to come thither, when other Cities and Towns near at hand be demolished or defaced: And impossible it is without this order of proceeding, to enlarge any City or make the same of greater power. Example, The *Romans* to enlarge their City demolished *Alba*, and many other Towns, and therewith also entertained all strangers courteously: So as *Rome* grew to such greatness, that the City onely could arm Six hundred

hundred and forty thousand men ; but *Sparta* or *Athens* could never exceed Twenty thousand, for that *Lycurgus* had inhibited the access of strangers.

A Commonwealth that consumes more Treasure in the War, then it profits in Victory, seems to have rather hindred then honored or enriched the State. A wise Captain therefore in his actions, ought as well to profit the Republick, as to gain to himself glory. Example, the Consuls of *Rome* did seldom desire Triumph, unless they returned from the War loaden with Gold, Silver, and other rich spoils fit to be delivered into the Common Treasury.

All Foreign Wars with Princes or other States taken in hand, be either for Ambition or Desire of glory, or else for necessity. Examples, the *Romans* for their Ambition conquered many Nations, with intent onely to have the obedience of the people ; yet did they suffer them to hold possession of their Houses, and sometimes they were permitted to live onely with their old Laws. Likewise *Alexander* the Great endeavored to suppress many Princes for his glory, but did not dispossess the people, nor kill them.

Otherwise it is where a whole Nation inforced by Famine or Fury of War, abandon

don their own dwellings, and are forced to inhabit elsewhere. Example, The *Goths* and other people of the North invaded the *Roman* Empire, and many other Provinces, whereof their alteration of names did ensue; as *Illyria* now called *Slavonia*, *England* formerly named *Britain*.

A common conceit and saying it is. That Money makes the War strong, and is the force and sinews thereof; as though he who hath most Treasure, be also most mighty; but experience hath apparently shewed the contrary. Example, After the death of *Alexander*, King of *Macedon*, a multitude of *Galls* went into *Greece*, and being there arived, sent certain Ambassadors to the King, who supposing to make them afraid of his power, shewed them his treasure, which wrought a contrary effect; for the *Galls* before desirous of Peace, resolved then to continue the War, in hope to win that mighty mass of Money. Likewise *Darius* should have vanquished *Alexander*, and the *Greeks* might have conquered the *Romans*, if the richer Prince might ever by his Money have prevailed.

Every League made with a Prince or Republick remote, is weak and rather aideth us with Fame then Effect, and consequently deceiveth all those that in such Amity repose Confidence.

Confidence. Example, The *Florentines* being assaulted by the King of *Naples* and the Pope, prayed aid of the French King, who being far distant, could not in time succor them; and the *Cedicini* desiring aid of the *Capuani* against the *Samnits*, a people of no force, were deceived.

A Prince whose people is well armed and trained, shall do better to attend his enemy at home, then by invasion to assault his Countrey: But such Princes whose Subjects are disarmed, had need to hold the enemy aloof. Example, The *Romans*, and in this age the *Swisses*, being well armed, may attend the War at home; but the *Carthaginians* and *Italians* being not so well furnished, did ever use to seek the enemy.

The Plurality of Commanders in equal Authority, is for the most part occasion of slow proceeding in the War. Example, There was at one time in *Rome* created four *Tribuni Militares* with authority of Consuls, viz. *T. Quintus* after his Consulship, *Cajus Furius*, *M. Posthumus*, and *A. Cornelius Cassus*, amongst whom arose so much diversity and contrariety of opinion, as nothing could be done till their authority ceased, and *M. Amyllus* made Dictator.

A Victory obtained by any great Captain

tain with the Authority of his Princes Commission, Counsel, and Directions, ought ever to be imputed rather to the wisdom of the Prince, then the valor of the Captain: Which made the Emperors of *Rome* to permit no Captains (how great soever his victories were) to Triumph, as before that time the Consuls had done; and even in those days a modest refusal of Triumph was commended. Example, *M. Fulvius* having gained a great victory against the *Tuscan*s, was both by the consent of the Senate and people of *Rome*, admitted to Triumph; but the refusal of that Honor proved his greater glory.

All they that from private estate have aspired to Principality, either by Force or Fraud become thereunto, unless the same be given, or by inheritance descended: Yet it is rarely seen, that Force alone prevaieth, but Fraud without Force oft times sufficeth. Example, *Agathocles* by such means became Prince of *Syracusa*; *John Galeazzo* by abusing his Uncle *Barnabas*, gained the Dominion of *Lombardy*; and *Cyrus* circumvented *Cyaxares* his Mothers Brother, and by that craft aspired to greatness.

Sudden Resolutions are always dangerous; and no less peril ensueth of slow and doubtful delays. Example, When *Hieron* Prince

Prince of *Syracusa* died, the War even then being in great heat between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, they of *Syracusa* consulted, whether it were better to follow the Fortune of *Rome* or *Carthage*. In which doubt, they continued until *Apollonides* a cheif Captain of *Syracusa* laid before them, that so long delay would make them hated both of *Romans* and *Carthaginians*. Likewise the *Florentines* being by *Lewis* the Twelfth required to give his Army passage towards *Naples*, mused so long upon answer, that he became their enemy, and they forced to recover his favor full dearly.

To govern a State is nothing else but to take such order as the Subjects may not, or ought not offend; which may be done, either by removing from them all means to disobey, or by affording them so great favors, as reasonably they ought not to change their Fortune; for the mean course proveth dangerous. Example, the *Latins* being by the valor of *Camillus* overcome, yeelded themselves to endure what punishment it pleased the *Romans* to inflict.

An ingenious and magnanimous answer being made unto wise Magistrates, doth oft obtain both Pardon and Grace. Example, When the *Privernates* had rebelled, and were

were by force constrained to return to the obedience of the *Romans*, they sent certain of the City unto *Rome* to desire pardon; who being brought before the Senate, one of the Senators asked the *Privernates*, what punishment themselves did think they had deserved: The same, quoth they, which men living in freedom, think they are worthy of. Whereto the Consul thus replied, *Quid si penam remittimus? Qualem nos pacem vobiscum habituros speremus?* The *Privernates* answered, *Si bonam dederitis, & fidem & perpetuam: Si malam, haud aeternam.* Which answer was thought to proceed from generous men, and therefore they were not onely pardoned, but also honored and received into the number of the *Roman* Citizens.

All Castles, Fortresses, and Places of strength, be made for defence either against the enemy or Subject: In the first case they are not necessary, in the second dangerous. For thereby the Prince may at his pleasure take occasion to insult upon the Subject, when much more seemly he might settle his estate upon the love and good affection of Men. Example, The Castle of *Milan* made by Duke *Francisco Sforza*, incited his Heirs to become insolent; and consequently they became odious; which was also the cause

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that so soon as that City was assaulted, the enemy with facility did possess it.

That Prince or Potentate which builds his Severity rather upon the trust he hath in Fortresses, then the love of Men, shall be deceived: For no place is so strong, as can long defend it self, unless by the love and aid of Men it be in time of necessity succored. Example, Pope *Julius* having drawn the *Ben*-*rivolt* out of *Bologna*, built there a strong Castle; the Governor thereof robbed the people, and they therewith grieved, in a short time took the Castle from him. So after the revolt of *Ginos*, *Lewis* the Twelfth came to the recovery thereof, and builded there the strongest Fortification of *Italy*, as well for site as the circumstances inexpugnable. Nevertheless the Citizens rebelled, and within sixteen moneths the French were forced to yield the Castle and Government to *Ottavio Fragosa*.

To build Forts upon places of strength, either for defence of our own, or to hold that which is taken from others, hath ever proved to small purpose. Example, The *Romans* having suppress the Rebellion of the *Latins* and *Privernates*; albeit they were people Warlike, and lovers of Liberty; yet to keep them Subject, built there no Castles, nor other places fortified: And the
Lacædæ-

Lacedemonians did not onely forbear to fortifie the Towns they conquered, but also left their cheif City of *Sparta* un-walled.

The necessity or use of Fortification, is onely upon Frontiers or such principal places where Princes make their Habitation; to the end the fury of sudden assaults may be staid, and time for succor entertained: Otherwise, example, the Castle of *Millan* being made to hold the State in obedience, could not so do either for the house of *Sforza* or *France*. *Guido Ubaldo*, Duke of *Velin*, driven from his Dominion by *Cesar Borgia*, so soon as he recovered his Countrey, caused all the Forts to be demolished: For by experience he found the love of Men was the surest defence, and that Fortifications prevailed no less against him then for him.

The causes of Division and Faction in every Commonweal proceed most commonly of Idleness and Peace, and that which uniteth, is Fear and War. Example, The *Vejenti* and *Eliaſci* having intelligence of great contention between the Nobility and People of *Rome*, thought that a fit opportunity to oppress the one and the other: But the *Romans* informed of such an intention, appeased all Domestick anger, and by the Valor of their Arms conducted by

Gn. Manlius and *M. Fabius* defeated the Enemies Forces.

The means to usurpe an estate disjoyned is first before Arms be taken, to become as it were an Arbitrator or a friend indifferent; and after Arms be taken, then to send moderate aid to the weak side, as well to entertain the War between the Factions, as also to consume the strength both of the one, and the other, yet in no wise to employ any great forces, for thereby either party may discover the intents to suppress them. Example, The City of *Pisapia* fallen into division, the *Florentines* took occasion sometimes to favor the one, and some times the other, that in the end both sides weary of the War, voluntarily yeilded to their devotion. *Philippo Viscount*, hoping sundry times by occasion of Faction to oppress the *Florentines*, did often assault them with great forces, which was the cause that they became reunited; and consequently the Duke deceived of his expectation

A great Wisdom it is to refrain Opprobrious and Injurious speech: for as neither the one nor the other can any whit decrease the Enemies force, so doth it move him to greater hate, and more desire to offend. Example, *Gabides* a General of the *Persians* having long besieged *Amida*, became

became weary; and preparing to abandon the enterprize, raised his Camp, which they of the City beholding, began to revile the *Persians*, and from the Walls reproved them of Cowardise; which undiscreet words so highly offended *Gabides*, as thereupon he resolved to continue the siege, and within few daies won the City. *Tiberius Gracchus* appointed Captain of certain bands of men, whom for want of other Soldiers the *Romans* entertained, proclaimed in his Camp, that no man upon pain of death should contumeliously call any Soldier slave, either in earnest or jest. *Nam facies aspera quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem sui memoriam velinquunt.* Likewise *Alexander* the great having conquered well near all the East, brought his forces before *Tyre*, they fearing *Alexanders* fury, offered upon honorable considerations to yeild him obedience, only requiring, that neither he nor any of his forces should enter the City; which motion after four Moneths *Alexander* accepted, and so signified by his Ambassador who arriving in *Tyre* was by the proud Citizens slain, whereat *Alexander* grew into Choler and being ready to forsake the siege, staid his forces, and in the end sacked the City and put the people to the sword.

A Prince or any other State being assaulted by an Enemy of far more puissance then himself, ought not to refuse any honorable compositions, chiefly when they are offered, for no conditions can be so base but shall in some sort turn to the advantage and honor of him that accepts them. Example, *Anno 1512.* certain *Florentines* procured great forces of *Spaniards* to come thither, as well to repose the *Medici* then banisht, as also to sack the City; promising that so soon as the Army of *Spain* did come into the *Florentine* dominion, the faction of *Medici* would be ready armed to receive them. But the *Spaniards* being come, found no forces at all to joyn with them; and therefore wanting victual, offered composition. The *Florentines* finding the Enemy distressed grew insolent and refused peace, whereof followed the loss of *Prato*, and many other inconveniencies. The like happened to them of *Tyre*, as before.

The denial or delay of Justice desired in revenge of injuries either publick or privately offered, is a thing very dangerous to every Prince or other State, for that the party injured doth oft by indirect means though with hazard of his country and himself seek satisfaction: Example, the complaint which the *Galli* made against the *Fa-*

his who sent Ambassadors in favor of the *Tossani*, not being heard, nor any punishment inflicted upon them for fighting against the Law of Nations, was the cause that the *Galli* were offended with the States, whereof followed the sack of *Rome*; and the delay of Justice in *Philip of Macedon*, for not revenging the incestuous oppression of *Attalus* to *Pausanias*, was the motive to murder that King.

Whoso endeavors the alteration of any State, must of necessity proceed with all severity, and leave some memorable example to those that shall impunge the Ordinance of Government newly settled. Example, when *Junius Brutus* had by his great valor banisht the *Tarquins*, and sworn the People that no King should ever raign in *Rome*: within short time after, many young Nobles, among whom was *Brutus* son, impatient of the equality of the new government, conspired to recall the *Tarquins*; but *Brutus* thereof informed, caused his own son not only to be condemned to death, but was himself present at the execution.

As health and soundness of the hands, legs, and other outward members cannot continue life, unless the heart and vital spirits within be strong and firm; so fortifications and Frontier-defences do not prevail

vail, unless the whole Corps of the Kingdom and People be well armed : Example, when the Emperor came into *Italy*, and had with some difficulty past the confines of the *Venetians* welnear without resistance; his army marcht to *Venice*, and might doubtless have posselt the City, had it not been defended with water. Likewise the English in their assault of *France*, excepting a few encounters on the Frontiers, found no puissant resistance within the Realm. And *Anno* 1513 they forced all that State, and the King himself to tremble, as oft before they had done; but contrariwise the Romans knowing that life lay in the heart, ever held the body of their State strongest : for the nearer the enemy approacht *Rome*, the better they found the Countrey armed and defended.

The desire to command soveraignly is of so great force, as doth not only work in those that are in expectation of principality, but also in them that have no title at all. Example, this appetite moved the wife of *Tam-quinus Priscus* contrary to all natural duty to incite her husband to murder her own Father *Servius*, and possesse his Kingdom, as being perswaded it were much more honorable to be a Queen then to be the daughter of a King.

The violation of ancient Laws, Orders, and Customs, under which people have long time lived, is the chief and only cause whereby Princes hazard their Estate and Royal Dignity. Example, albeit the deflowring of *Lucrece* was the occasion, yet was it not the cause that moved the *Romans* to take arms against *Tarquinius*; for he having before that fact of *Sexius* his Son, governed Tyrannically, and taken from the Senate all Authority, was become odious both to the Senate, Nobility, and People, who finding themselves well governed, never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration.

A Prince that desires to live secure from conspiracy, hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over great riches and honors, then those whom he hath greatly injured; because they want meanes to offend; the other have many opportunities to do it. Example, *Perennis* the Prime favorite of *Commodus* the Emperor conspired his death. *Plantianus* did the like to *Severus*, and *Sejanus* to *Tiberius*; for being advanced to so great honors, riches, and Offices as nothing remained desirable but the Imperial title, they conspired against the persons of their Sovereigns in hope of the dignity; but in the end they endured that punishment which to such disloyalty and ingratitude appertaineth.

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An Army which wants Experience, albeit the Captain be expert, is not greatly to be feared; neither ought an Army of well traind Soldiers to be much esteemed, whose Captain is ignorant. Example, *Cæsar* going into *Africa* against *Africanus* and *Petrus* whose army was full of old Soldiers, said he feared them little, *Quia ibat ad exercitum sine duce*. Contrariwise, when he went to *Pharsalia* to encounter *Pompey*, he said, *Ibo ad ducem sine exercitu*.

A Captain-General commanding an Army ought rather to governe with curtesie and mildness, then with over-much austerity and severity. Example, *Q.* and *Appianus Claudius* being Consuls, were appointed to govern the War. To *Q.* was allotted one Army which served very dutifully; but *Appianus* commanding the other with great cruelty, was by his Soldiers unwillingly obeyed. Nevertheless *Tacitus* seems of contrary opinion, saying, *Plus pœna quam obsequium valet*.

Therefore to reconcile these different Conceits, I say, that a General having power to command men, either they are confederates or Subjects: If confederates or voluntaries, he may not proceed to extreame punishment; if Subjects, and his power absolute, they may be governed otherwise; yet

yet with such respect, as the insolence of the General inforce not the Soldiers to hate him.

Honor may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of victory. Every man knoweth glory is due to the Victor, and we deny not the same priviledge to the vanquished, being able to make proof that the loss proceeded not from his default. Neither is it dishonorable to violate those promises whereto the necessity or disadvantage of War inforceth. And forced promises which concern a whole State, are not binding, and rarely or never kept, nor is the Breaker thereby to receive disgrace. Example, *Posthumus* the Consul having made a dishonorable peace with the *Samnites*, was by them with his whole Army sent home disarmed. Being arived at *Rome*, the Consul informed the people they were not bound to perform the base conditions he was compelled to yield unto; albeit, he and those few that promised, were bound to perform them. The Senate thereupon concluded to send him prisoner to *Samno*, where he constantly protested the fault to be onely his own; wherefore the people by that peace incurred no dishonor at all: And Fortune so much favored *Posthumus*, as the *Samnites* were content presently to return him

him to *Rome*; where he became more glorious for losing the Victory, then was *Pontius* at *Samno* for having won the victory.

Wise men have long observed, that who so will know what shall be, must consider what is past; for all worldly things hold the same course they had at first. The reason is, that as long as men are possess'd with the same Passions with former ages, consequently of these doings the same effects ensue. Example; The *Almains* and *French* have ever bin noted for their Avarice, Pride, Fury, and Infidelity, and so in divers ages, experience hath proved even to this present: For perfidious dealing the French have given sufficient proof, not onely in ancient times, but also in the time of *Charls* the Eighth, who promised to render to the *Florentines* the Forts of *Pisa*, but having divers times received money, held them notwithstanding in possession. The *Florentines* found the like in the *Almains*; for in the Wars of the *Visconti*, Dukes of *Milan*, they prayed aid of the Emperor, who promised them great forces; in consideration whereof, he was to receive of the *Florentines* One hundred thousand Crowns in hand, and as much more when his Army was arived in *Italy*, both which payments were performed;
but

but as soon as the Emperor came to *Verona*, he devised cavillations of unkindness, whereupon he returned home.

A Prince desirous to obtain any thing of another, must if occasion so permit, urge his demand so earnestly and press for so sudden and present answer, as he who is prest may not have leisure to consider how to excuse himself in denial. Example Pope *Julio* endeavored to drive out of *Bologna* all the *Bentivoli* in which action he thought the aid of the French necessary, and that the *Venetians* should stand neutral; and by divers messengers did sollicite them to that effect; but not receiving any resolute answer, he thought fit with those few forces he had to take his journey to *Bologna*, whereupon the *Venetians* advertised him they would remain neutral, and the French King forthwith sent him forces as fearing the Popes indignation; likewise the *Tuscan*s having formerly desired aid of the *Samnites* against the *Romans*, took Armes suddenly and obtained their request which the *Samnites* had before denied.

When a multitude offendeth, all may not be punisht, because they are too many: to punish part and leave the rest unpunisht, were injurie to the sufferers; and to those that escape, an encouragement to offend again;

gain; therefore to eschew all extremity, mean courses have bin anciently used. Example, When all the Wives of the *Romans* conspired to poyson their Husbands, a convenient number of them were punisht, and the rest suffered to pass: Likewise at the conspiracy of the *Bacchanals* in the time of the *Macedonian* War, wherein many thousands Men and Women had part, every tenth person only was put to death by lot, although the offence were general, by which manner of punishing, he that suffered, complained on his fortune; and he that escaped, was put in feare that offending again, the same punishment might light upon himself, and therefore would no more offend.

A Battel or great action in Armes ought not to be enterprised without special Commission or Command from the Prince, otherwise the General incurs great danger. Example, *Papirius* the Dictator punisht the General of the horse in the *Roman* Army, for having fought without his consent, although he had in battaile slain 20000 Enemies without loss of 200 of his own, and *Cesar* commended his Captain *Silanus* for having refrained to fight, though with great advantage he might. Also Count *Egmont* hazarded the favor of the King his Master

Master for giving battel to Marshall *de Thermes*, albeit he were victorious: for upon the success of that action the loss or or safety of all the Low Countries depended.

To govern without Council is not only dangerous in *Aristocracies* and Popular States, but unto independent Princes an occasion of utter ruine. Example, *Hieron* the first King of *Sicile* in all his proceedings used the advice of Counsels, and lived fifty years prosperously in Peace, but his grandchild succeeding, refusing all Counsell lost his Kingdom, and was with all his Kinsfolk and Friends cruelly slain.

In all Monarchies the Senate or privy-Council is or ought to be composed of persons of great dignity, or men of approved wisdom and understanding. Example, In *Polonia* no man is Counsellor unless he be a *Palatine*, a *Bishop*, a *Castellan*, a *Captain*, or such a one as hath bin Ambassador: and in *Turky* the title of Counsellor is not given but only to the four *Bassas*. the two *Cadelesquires*, the twelve *Beglerbegs*, and Kings son, who in his Fathers absence, is as it were, a president of the *Divano* or Senate.

Many Princes Ancient and Modern have used to select out of their Council, two or three

three or four at most, to whom only they did impart their affairs. Example, The Emperor *Augustus* had *Mecenas* and *Agrippa*. *Julius Caesar*, *Q. Papius* and *Cor. Balbus*, whom he only trusted with his Cipher and secrets, being Counsellors of the Cabinet (as we now call them.)

The alteration of old Laws, or introduction of new, are in all States very dangerous, notwithstanding any appearance of profit or publick utility, which moved wise Governors to decree, that ancient Lawes once established might never be called in question. Example, The *Athenians* decreed that no Law should be propounded to the people without the consent of the Senate: the like use is observed in *Venice* where no Petition is preferred to the Senate but by advice of the Sages; and among the *Locrians* the Custom was that whosoever presented any new Law to be confirmed, should come with a halter about his Neck, and be therewith hanged if his request were rejected; also *Lycurgus* to prevent the alteration of his Lawes, did sweare the people of *Sparta* to observe them untill his return, and thereupon retired himself into voluntary exile, with intent never to returne.

When necessity or good reason moves Innovation or Abolition of Laws, a course more
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more secure it is to do it rather by degrees then suddenly. Example, The *Romans* finding the Laws of the twelve Tables unprofitable, suffered them to be observed or neglected at discretion, but would not publicly suppress them for fear of calling other Laws into contempt: so did they continue 700 years, and were then cassed by *Ebutius* the Tribune. But *Agis* King of *Lacedemon* desirous to revive the Laws of *Lycurgus*, long discontinued, enforced all men to bring in their evidence and writings to be cancelled, to the end a new partition of Lands and Goods might be made, which sudden and violent proceeding proved so fatal, that it moved a dangerous sedition, wherein he was deposed and with his Mother and Friends put to death; which Example haply moved the *Venitians* not to attempt any thing against the Authority of *Augustino Barberino* their Duke: but after his death, and before the Election of *Loredono*, the *Signiory* publisht new Ordinances detractive from the *Ducal* Authority.

Whoso hath won to himself so great Love and Affection, as thereby to become master of the forces, and at his pleasure commands the Subjects apt for Armes, may also without right or title assure himself of the whole Estate. Example, *Hugh*

Caput a Subject to the Crown of *France*, being greatly honored by the Soldiers, found means thereby to prevent (*Charles Duke of Lorraine* of the Crown, being right heire by descent from *Charlemaine*. And albeit the Families of the *Paleologi*, *Ebrami* and *Turcani* be of the blood Royall and Right Heires to the *Turkish* Empire, when the *Ottaman* Line shall faile; yet it is like that the cheif *Bassa* having the love of the *Janisaries* will usurpe the State, because the *Paleologi* and other Competitors be far from the *Turks* person, poor and without means to purchase the Soldiers favor.

A Commander General in Armes, ought upon paine of great punishment be enjoyned, not to imploy or retain any forces longer then the time of his Commission. Example, The *Dictators* of *Rome* were in this point so precise, as never any of them dared to transgress the time prefixed, till *Cesar* obtained that dignity should continue in him for life: which was the cause of his usurpation of the State. Also the *Thebans* commanded, that if the General of their Army did hold his forces one day longer then the time prefixt, he should thereby incur danger of death: which Justice was executed upon *Epaminondas* and *Pelopidas*.

Banish-

Banishment of great Lords, or Citizens of great Reputation, hath bin in divers places diversly used: for in the one, they were enforced only to absent themselves without further infliction; in the other, Banishment was accompanied with Confiscation, a course of great danger. Example; In *Argos*, *Athens*, *Ephesus*, and other Cities of *Greece*, the Citizens puissant in Friends, Vertue or Riches, were many times banisht for envy or feare, but never or very rarely forced to absent themselves longer then Ten years; and that without loss of goods, which was the cause that never any of them Warred against the Country: but *Dion* being banisht *Syracusa* by *Dionysius Junior*, and *Coriolanus* from *Rome*, did make mighty Wars against their own Country. The like was done by the *Medici* in *Florence*.

Honorable and Magnanimous men were wont, not only to enterprize great Acts, but also to suffer patiently all injuries which Foes or Fortune could expose them to: as resolved, that no Calamity was so great as to make their minds abject; or to forget the dignity appertaining to persons vertuous: Example After the defeat of the *Roman* Army upon the River *Albia*, the *Galli* pursued the Victory even to *Romes* Walls: whither being come, and finding the gates

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open

open, without any signe of resistance they entered the Streets, where all honorable Palaces were also unshut, which caused the *Galli* greatly to doubt. Nevertheless looking into the houses, they found in every of them a Senator set in a Chaire of State, and in his hand a Rod of Ivory; his person was also vested with Robes of dignity, which Majestick spectacle did marvelously amaze the *Galli* not having before that time seen any such Reverend sight; and therefore did not only refrain to offer violence, but highly admired the *Roman* Courage, chiefly in that Fortune. Nevertheless at length a rude *Gall* hapned with his hand to touch the white beard of *M. Pappius*, whereat he taking great disdain struk him with his Rod, in requitall whereof the Barbarian slew *Pappius*, and by that example all the other Senators and persons of dignity were also slain.

Albeit the knowledge and study of Letters be both commendable and necessary in all well regulated States; yet if under so honest pretence, idleness enter, such abuses must seasonably be foreseen and removed. Example, When *Diogenes* and *Carneades* two excellent Philosophers, were sent Ambassadors from *Athens* to the *Romans*, many of the Nobility that before disposed them-

themselves to Arms, allured with their Eloquence and marvellous wisdom, began with great admiration to follow them: and in lieu of Armes, turned their endeavors to the studie of Letters, which the wise *Cato* discerning, procured the Senate to decree that (to eschew all inconveniences which so honest idleness might breed) no philosophers should from thenceforth be received into *Rome*.

The Honor due to Magistrates was anciently much regarded, and contrarywise all irreverent and undutifull behavior with great severity punisht. Example, The Censors of *Rome* degraded a Citizen only for having yawned loud in their presence: and another called *Vestinus* was slain in the field for not doing due reverence to a Tribune when he past by him. It is also observed, that the son of *Fab. Maximus* when he was *Censor*, meeting his Father on horseback, and seeing the Serjeants afraid to speak to him to dismount, did himself command him so to do, which Command the Father cheerfully and willingly obeyed, saying, Domestick power must give place to Publick Authority.

Tyrannous Princes having incurred the universal hate of people, found no meanes so meet to preserve them from Popular fury,

as to execute or deliver into their hands their own cheef Minions and intimate Counsellors. Example; *Tiberius* delivered to the People his favorite *Sejanus*; *Nero*; *Tigellinus*. Henry King of *Swed* committed to their fury his best beloved servant *George Prefton*; *Caracalla* caused all his flatterers to be slain that had perswaded him to kill his brother. The like was done by *Caligula*; whereby he escaped himself.

A Prince that rewards or pardons a person that kills another Prince, albeit by that means he is aspired to Sovereignty, shall thereby both incur great danger and hate, and encourage men therein to attempt the like against himself. Therefore wise Princes have not only left such services quite uncompenced, but also most severely punished them. Example. The Emperor *Severus* put all those to death that consented to the murder of *Pertinax*; and *Alexander* the great executed him that slew *Darius*, as abhorring that Subject that would lay violent hands on his Prince, notwithstanding he were an enemy. Likewise *Vitellius* put to death all the Murderers and conspirators against *Galba*; and *Domitian* executed his Secretary *Epaphroditus* for the Murder of *Nero*, although he instantly desired his aid.

The vertuous and vitious examples of Princes incite Subjects to imitate the same Qualities; which rule never or very rarely fails. Example, *Francis* the First King of *France*, and other Princes in divers ages and places, had great esteem of Learned Men; and forthwith all the Princes, Nobles, Nobility, and Clergy, disposed themselves so earnestly to study, as before that time had not been seen so many and so great a number of Learned Men, as well in Tongues as Sciences. Contrariwise, *Alixander* the Great, otherwise a Prince of great vertue, by his immoderate use of drinking, did draw the greatest number of his Court and people also to delight in drunkenness. The like effect followed the excessive intemperance of *Mithridates*, King of *Amasia*.

The last and not the least considerable, is to observe how great effects Devotion and Contempt of Humane glory worketh in the mindes not onely of private persons, but of Kings and Princes also, who have oft abandoned worldly Profit Honor, and Pleasure, to embrace the contemplative retired life. Example, *Ramirus* King of *Aragon*, *Verecundus* King of *Spain*, *Charlemain* Son of *Carolus Martellus*, *Matilda* Queen of *France*, *Amurath* K. of *Turbay*, with many others. *Imperio Maximus, exemplo Major.*

FINIS.